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PROTECTING UNIONIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S
MISINTERPRETA TI ON OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

BY
ANN C. HODGES'

The Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Inter1
state/Johnson Lane Corporation initiated a barrage of employer efforts to dismiss or stay employment discrimination actions in judicial
forums based on contractual arbitration agreements. Many of the
agreements that formed the basis of employer motions were in. the
nonunion setting, but despite the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company,' employers also have sought
dismissal of discrimination claims based on the existence of grievance
and arbitration procedures in collective bargaining agreements. The
Fourth Circuit is the only circuit thus far to have dismissed employee
discrimination claims on the basis of the employee's failure to arbitrate using a collectively bargained arbitration procedure.' The other
circuits that have addressed the issue have refused to find that arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements bar judicial

' Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., University of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill; M.A., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; J.D., Northwestern University. Lisa R.
Butler, J.D. 1998, and Tracey Watkins, Class of 1999, University of Richmond, provided valuable
research assistance. I also am indebted to Irving M. Friedman, Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle,
for his insightful advice and coinments on an earlier draft of this article and for his wise counsel
throughout my career.
I. 500 U.S. 20 (1991) .
. 2. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court held that an employee's
cl~1m that his discharge violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act could proceed in court despite a
pnor arbitration under the co11ective bargaining agreement in which the discharge was upheld.
3. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 121 F.3d 702, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir.
July 29, 1997) (unpublished opinion), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998); Austin v. OwensBr?ckway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996). The
Thir~ Circuit reached a similar result, but subsequently vacated and changed its decision. See
Martin v. Dana Corp., 135 F.2d 765, 156 L.R.R.M. 3137 (3d Cir. 1997). The issue is not limited to
fe~eral courts and employment discrimination claims. In July 1997, a circuit court in Virginia
relted on Austin to dismissed an employee's claim that she was terminated in retaliation for filing
a :workers' compensation claim in violation of state law. See Graham v. Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative, No. 41065 (1st Jud. Circ. 1997).
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litigation of federal statutory claims.' The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in a Fourth Circuit case to resolve the split in the
circuits.'
The Fourth Circuit's approach to the issue misinterprets the law
as set forth by the Supreme Court and demonstrates a lack of understanding of the operation of the grievance and arbitration procedure
in the collective bargaining context. The decisions create great difficulty for unions seeking to protect bargaining unit employees from
discriminatory treatment. The Supreme Court should resolve this
split in the circuits by reaffirming Gardner-Denver's holding that employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement can litigate discrimination claims in federal court, whether or not they choose to
avail themselves of the contractual grievance and arbitration procedure.
This article will first review the Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence, concentrating on labor and employment law cases.
Next, the article will analyze the cases involving arbitration under
collective bargaining agreements decided by the courts of appeals
subsequent to Gilmer. The article will then evaluate the two different approaches of the circuit courts in light of the law relating to
collective bargaining and union representation. Finally, the article
will review alternative methods of protecting employee rights to determine whether unions can preserve employees' statutory rights under the rule of the Fourth Circuit. The article concludes that the Supreme Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit in order to effectuate
the purposes of both national labor policy and antidiscrimination
law. ·
I. TH]:': SUPREME COURT'S ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE

Since at least 1960, when it decided the Steelworkers Trilogy,

6

4. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Aug. 6.1997) (No. 97-232); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 295 (1997); Penny v. United Parcel Service, 128 F.3d 408 {6th Cir.
1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Dana

Corp., 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3137 {3d Cir. 1997); Varner v. National Super Mkts, Inc., 94 F.3d
1209 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 946 (1997); Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d
1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993).
5. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 121 F.3d 702, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. July
29, 1997) (unpublished opinion), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998).
6. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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the Supreme Court has been solicitous of the arbitration of disputes
arising under collectively bargained agreements. In the Trilogy, the
Court affirmed the national labor policy favoring arbitration, limiting
the court's function to deciding whether the parties had agreed to
arbitrate the dispute and admonishing courts that "[aJn order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
1
should be resolved in favor of coverage. " The Court also examined
the judicial role in post-arbitration review of awards in the Trilogy,
ruling that courts should not reevaluate the merits of an arbitrator's
decision. The Court in the Trilogy recognized that labor arbitration
is not a "substitute for litigation," but rather a "substitute for industrial strife." 8 Arbitration is not solely a method of resolving disputes
between employees and the employer, but it is "an extension of the
collective bargaining process, the method by which meaning and content are given to the negotiated agreement."' The arbitrator's function is to read the contract, effectively striking a supplemental bargain for the parties to handle matters unanticipated at the time of
negotiations."'
For many years, the Court's deference to labor arbitration was
uuique. In the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court issued a series of
decisions enforcing commercial agreements to arbitrate statutory
clairns. 11 In the commercial context, the Court also concluded that
doubts about the scope of an agreement to arbitrate should be resolved in favor of coverage." In 1991, the Court addressed arbitration of a statutory employment discrimination claim in Gilmer,
7. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83. The Court also held that in determining arbitrability
of a dispute, the courts should not weigh the inerits of the grievance, noting that the processing of
even frivolous claims may have therapeutic value. American Mfg, 363 U.S. at 568.
8. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
9. Ann C. Hodges, The Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
63!, 635 (1990).
10. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look
at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REY.1137, 1140 (1977).
11. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) {enforcing
agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (enforcing agreement to _arbitrate claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (enforcing agreement
to ~rbitrate claims based on antitrust law). For a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's
~~-1~ration jurisprudence, see Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is fVo Excuse: Judiu1JtiD.n..:..:""

•
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holding that the employee, who had agreed to arbitrate disputes regarding his employment in his registration application for the New
York Stock Exchange, was required to arbitrate his statutory age
13
discrimination claim despite his objections. Prior to the Gilmer decision, however, the Court had addressed the impact of grievance
ar1
bitration on a statutory Title VII claim in Gardner-Denver. '
The employee in Gardner-Denver filed suit under Title VII alleging that his discharge was because of his race." The employee had
previously arbitrated his discharge under the just cause provision of
the collective bargaining agreement between his employer and his
union and had raised his claim of race discrimination in the arbitration. The arbitrator's decision denied the grievance, finding that the
discharge was for just cause, but did not expressly address the issue
of race discrimination. The district court and the court of appeals
agreed with the employer's argument that the employee was bound
by the arbitrator's decision and had no right to sue under Title VIL
The Supreme Court upheld the employee's right to sue despite the
arbitration decision, rejecting the argument that the employee had
waived his cause of action under Title VIL The Court noted that
while the union could waive statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to strike, the union could not waive the individual's statutory right to be free from discrimination through the
collective bargaining process." Nor did the employee's submission
of his grievance to the arbitration process waive his statutory right
since the process was an indep~ndent method of enforcing a contrac17
tual, rather than a statutory obligation. The Court emphasized the
latter.point by noting that the arbitrator's authority related only to
contractual matters, not legislation, even if the contractual rights and
the statutory rights were identical."
Despite the national labor policy favoring arbitration, the Court
reasoned that upholding the employee's right of access to a judicial
1
forum would not unduly discourage arbitration. ' Unlike commercial
arbitration, which substitutes for litigation, labor arbitration is a substitute for the strike, providing a strong incentive for employers to
13. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
14. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 38.
15. All facts have been taken from the Court's opinion in Gardner-Denver. Id. at 38-43.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.

al 51-52.
at 52.
at 53-54.
at 54.
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agree to arbitrate even if statutory claims can be the subject of later
litigation. 20 Furthermore, arbitration of the statutory claim might resolve the issue, rendering litigation unnecessary, although permissible.21
The employer also urged the Court to rule that courts must defer to an arbitrator's decision in later litigation, if such litigation were
permitted." In addressing this argument, the Court concluded that
arbitration was an inappropriate forum for resolution of Title VII
claims." The Court supported this conclusion by pointing out that
arbitrators have authority only to enforce collective bargaining
agreements, not statutory claims, and that they are chosen because of
24
their expertise in the "law of the shop, not the law of the land."
The Court went on to note that the informality of the arbitration
procedure, including the inapplicability of the rules of evidence and
the absence or liniited use of discovery, compulsory process, cross
examination and testimony under oath, made arbitration a less appropriate forum tlian the courts· for Title VII cases." In a footnote,
the court also evinced concern for the fact that the union exclusively
controlled the collectively-bargained grievance and arbitration procedure." The interests of the employee/discriminatee and the union
might diverge and the union might subordinate the individual's interest to the collective interests of the bargaining unit employees."
The Court considered but rejected application of a more demanding deferral standard to resolve its concerns." A rule which
would require arbitration to contain the safeguards of litigation for
deferral purposes would reduce the benefits of arbitral informality,
while necessitating more extensive judicial review of the arbitration
decision to insure compliance with the standard, tliereby limiting the

20. Id. at 55.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 55-56. The proposed deferral rule would have granted summary judgment for the
em.player on the statutory claim, thereby dismissing the employee's action, if the discrimination
claim was before the arbitrator, the collective bargaining agreement prohibited discrimination of
the type alleged in the lawsuit, and the arbitrator had the authority to rule on the claim and order

a remedy. Id. at 56.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 57.
25. Id. at 57-58.
26. Id. at58n.19.
27. Id.
. 28. Id. at 58. The Court cited as an example the standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 58 (1972). Id. at 58 n.20.
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efficiency that a deferral rule would be designed to accomplish."
The Court also reasoned that a deferral rule might discourage utiliza30
tion of arbitration, generating more, rather than less litigation. Accordingly, the Court concluded that "the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory
employment practices could best be accommodated by permitting an
employee to fully pursue both his remedy under the grievancearbitration clause of a collective- bargaining agreement and his cause
31
of action under Title VII. "
In two subsequent cases, the Court reached the same conclusion
with respect to claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Section 1983.32 In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.," the Court
relied on Gardn.er-Denver to find that employees were not barred
from bringing a claim in federal court based on the Fair Labor Standards Act, despite their prior arbitration of their wage claims under
the collective bargaining agreement." Like the Court in GardnerDenver, the Barrentine Court recognized the risk to statutory rights
were they relegated to enforcement through a collectively bargained
grievance and arbitration procedure." Similarly, the Court noted
that an arbitrator expert in the law of the shop might not have the legal expertise or the authority to decide statutory claims." Finally,
the Court pointed out that the arbitrator could award only the relief
available under the contract, which was unlikely to include the liquidated damages, costs and attorney's fees available under the FLSA."
Again in McDonald v. City of West Branch," the Court evinced
29. Id. •t 59.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 59-60.
32. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (Section 1983); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act). Section 1983,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), provides inter alia:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The plaintiff in McDonald, a public employee, sued under Section 1983 alleging that his termination violated his first amendment rights.
33. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
34. Id. at 745-46.
35. Id. at 744-45.
36. Id. at 743. The concern about expertise was particularly acute in Barrentine which involved a joint arbitration board composed of union and management representatives. Id. at 731.
37. Id. at 745.
38. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
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a concern about the union's exclusive control over the grievance procedure, highlighting the possibility that the union "may present the
employee's grievance less vigorously, or make different strategic
choices than would the employee. Thus, where an arbitration award
accorded preclusive effect, an employee's opportunity to be compensated for a constitutional deprivation might be lost merely because
it
39
was not in the union's interest to press his claim vigorously ."
These three cases preceded the Supreme Court's decision in
Gilmer, where the Court distinguished them in ordering Gilmer to
40
arbitrate his age discrimination claim. Relying on the recent decisions in commercial arbitration cases, the Court found that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did not bar waiver of
the right to a judicial forum, and also rejected the argument that ar-41
bitration is not an adequate forum for resolving statutory claims.
The Court concluded that the plaintiff's reliance on Gardner-Denver

',
:f
l,7

v.
183,
~

,d.na-

:h in~
j731.

and its progeny was misplaced.
First, those cases did not involve the issue of the enforceability of
an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, they involved
the qnite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based
claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims.
Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was
held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions. Second, because
the arbitration in those cases occurred in the context of a collective-bargaining agreement, the claimants were represented by their
unions in the arbitration proceedings. An important concern
therefore was the tension between collective representation and
individual statutory rights, a concern not applicable to the present
case. Finally, those cases were not decided under the FAA, which
as discussed above, reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbi.
a
t ration agreements."

Since Gilmer, courts have regularly enforced agreements to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims in the nonunion
context." The courts have split, however, on whether the existence
39, Id. at 291.
40. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35.
41. Id. at 29-30.
42. Id. at 35.
43. See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971F.2d698 (11th Cir. 1992); Mago v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1991); see also Metz v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 39
1482 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding Title VII claims arbitrable but finding that employer waived
in this case); but see Prudential Corp. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), wt denied,
16.U.S. 812 (1995) (holding that the employees did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their

F.3~
~rb1tration
~<:·
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of arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements bars judicial litigation of statutory claims. A review of those cases demonstrates the opposing views.
II. POST-GILMER LOWER COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

In addition to a number of district courts, seven circuits have
faced the question of the impact of a collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause on a statutory discrimination action. The
Fourth Circuit stands alone in dismissing discrimination complaints
based on arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements,
while the Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh have
rejected employer motions to dismiss or stay judicial claims.

A. The Fourth Circuit
44

In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., the Fourth
Circuit issued the first and most definitive circuit court of appeals decision dismissing the plaintiff's claim where she failed to invol<e the
grievance and arbitration procedure of the collective bargaining
agreement. The majority in Austin began by citing the federal policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes." It then focused primarily on
Gilmer and looked to Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities
Act to discern whether Congress intended to preclude waiver of judicial remedies. 46 Since bo'th the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, amending Title VII, contained language encouraging the use of
alfernative dispute resolution, the court found no such intent."
While recognizing that the legislative history of both statutes focused
on voluntary use of ADR, the court both disregarded the authority
of the legislative history and suggested that the case at bar involved
voluntary arbitration. 48 The court dismissed the Supreme Court's
right to a judicial forum for litigation of discrimination claims); Rosenberg, v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. {BNA) 681 (D. Mass. 1998) (Congress did
not intend to permit compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims and the arbitral forum at issue
was inadequate to resolve the plaintiff's ADEA claim).
44. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cat. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
45. Id. at 879.
46. Id. at 880-82.
47. Id. at 881. But see Rosenberg, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (ENA) at 690-94 (concluding
that Congress did not intend to permit mandatory predispute agreements to arbitrate Title VII
claims).
48. 78 F.3d at 885-86.
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concern m Gilmer about tension between individual and collective
rights, finding that the plaintiff was a party to the collective bargain49
ing agreement through which she voluntarily agreed to arbitrate.
To the court, it made no difference whether the agreement to arbitrate was contained in an employment contract, a securities registration application, or a collective bargaining agreement."
To further support its decision, the Austin court cited the ability
of a union to waive employee rights protected by the National Labor
Relations Act. 51 The court found no distinction between such a
waiver and bargaining for arbitration which waived the individual's
right to a judicial forum. 52 Finally, the court also relied on judicial
decisions under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
requiring employees to exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedure prior to filing suit against the employer." Judge Hall dissented,
relying on the continued vitality of Gardner-Denver, which according
to Judge Hall governs arbitration of statutory claims in the context of
collective bargaining agreements." ·
Since Austin, the Fourth Circuit has twice addressed the issue.
First, in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corporation, the court
relied on Austin to dismiss an employee's Americans with Disabilities Act claim against a group of employers who were members of an
employer association. 55 Although there was a grievance and arbitration procedure in the collective bargaining agreement, Wright did
not file a grievance. 56 In an unpublished opinion, the court upheld
the district court''s dismissal of the claim based on the broad lan57
guage of the grievance and arbitration agreement. Since the contract stated that "this agreement is intended to cover all matters affecting wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment," the court concluded that the absence of any language
referring to the ADA or statutory disability discrimination claims did
58
not preclude dismissal based on failure to arbitrate. "An employer
49. Id. at 885.
50. Id.
51. Id., citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705 (1983).
52. Id. at 885.
53. Id., citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). The case cited involved suits for breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
54. Id. at 886-87 (Hall, J. dissenting).

55. 121 F.3d 702 (table), 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997) (unpublished opinion),
cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998).
56. Id. at *1.
57. Id. at *2.

58. Id.
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need not provide a laundry list of potential disputes in order for
them to be covered by an arbitration clause. . . . A narrower interpretation of the agreement would fly directly in the face of both the
ADA's statutory preference for arbitration, and the strong federal
59
policy favoring alternative dispute resolution (citations omitted)."
Several months later, the court again addressed the issue in a
case arising under the Railway Labor Act."' The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's Title VII and the
61
Family and Medical Leave Act claims based on Austin. The court
distinguished the case from Austin, holding that the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration provision did not cover statutory
disputes; instead it was limited to contractual disputes." The contractual prohibition of conduct similar to that prohibited by Title VII
and the FMLA was insufficient to create an obligation to arbitrate
63
statutory claims, according to the court. In accordance with the
earlier decision in Wright, however, the court stated that the parties
could agree to arbitrate disputes based on statutory and common law
claims and "would not need to mention in their agreement that a
statute was the source of a dispute committed to arbitration as long
as it were made clear that their agreement is sufficiently broad to in64
clude the arbitration of such disputes. "
Accordingly, in the Fourth Circuit, either contractual reference
to statutory rights or broad language indicating that the contract covers more than just contractual rights will bind employees to arbitrate
statutory claims. In contrast to lhe Fourth Circuit, each of the other
circuits has relied on the continuing viability of Gardner-Denver to
reject employer efforts to compel arbitration of statutory claims under collective bargaining agreements.

B. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to dismiss a claim
of disability discrimination .under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
based on the Railway Labor Act's requirement that minor disputes
59.
60.
61.
had no
merits.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Brown v. Trans World Airlines, 127 F.3d 337 {4th Cir.1997).
Id. at 338. The court, however, found that Brown failed to rebut facts showing that she
claim under the FMLA and upheld summary judgment on that cause of action on the
Id. at 342.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at341-42.
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be arbitrated." Although the court recognized that the claims implicated the collective bargaining agreement, it relied on GardnerDenver, Barrentine and McDonald to find that the employees were
entitled to proceed in court. 66 Gilmer did not apply, according to the
court, because the Federal Arbitration Act excludes contracts of railroad employees, and, in addition, Gilmer did not involve a collective
bargaining agreement." The court's decision, however, seemed to
rely in part on the inadequacy of the arbitration forum 68for the resolution of statutory claims, a rationale rejected in Gilmer.
Two years later, the Second Circuit again addressed the arbitration of statutory claims in Tran v. Tran." In that case, the court relied on Barrentine to reverse the district court's determination that
the employee was required to "exhaust his arbitral remedy prior to
70
filing" suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The court concluded that Barrentine not only survived Gilmer, but indeed had' recases .
newed vitality based on the Gilmer Court's distinction of the
71
involving arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.
C. The Eighth Circuit
72

In Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., the Eighth Circuit
upheld the district court's denial of the employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law based on the plaintiff's failure to exhaust the
65. Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992
(1993). The Railway Labor Act provides that minor disputes, disputes about the interpretation
of collective bargaining agreements, must be resolved exclusively by the statutory arbitration
procedure. Id. at 1034.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 1030-32. In a subsequent case, the District Court of Connecticut concluded
that the plaintiff must arbitrate his claims of race discrimination under § 1981 because the collective bargaining agreement prohibited "discrimination as defined by federal law and provide(d]
for arbitration of any violation." Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 959 F. Supp. 569, 573-74 (D.
Conn. 1997). The court relied on its prior decision in Claps v, Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F.
Supp. 141 (D. Conn. 1993), in which it established a rebuttable presumption that statutory clailns
were excluded from the collective bargaining process, but found the presumption rebutted in Almonte. 959 F. Supp. at 574. The Almonte court neither discussed Bates nor distinguished Al-

n1onte from Bates.
69. 54 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1995). cert. den;ed, 517 U.S. 1134 (1996).
70. Id. at 118, quoting Tran v, Tran, 847 F. Supp. at 309, The Ninth Circuit reached a similar
conclusion in a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case, which suggests that it would reach the
same conclusion with respect to discrimination claims. See Local 246, Utility Workers v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292 (9th Cir. 1996). On the other hand, discrimination claims may
be distinguished from FLSA claims based on the absence of statutory language in the FLSA encouraging alternative dispute resolution. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
71. 54 F.3d at 117.
72, 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996). cert. den;ed, 117 S. Ct. 946 (1997).
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collective bargaining agreement's grievance and arbitration procedure before filing a Title VII sexual harassment case. The court,
with little discussion, relied on Gardner-Denver to hold that exhaustion was not required. Later, in Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, the
contained
court reiterated, in dicta, that "arbitration agreements
73
within a CBA do not bar civil claims under Title VII."

D. The Seventh Circuit
While the Second and Eighth Circuits followed the GardnerDenver line of cases with limited analysis, the Seventh Circuit engaged in a far more extensive analytical review before concluding
that the availability of arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement did not require the court to stay judicial litigation of statutory claims. 74 The consolidated case involved two plaintiffs, one alleging race discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981 and disability discrimination under the ADA and the second alleging age
and disability discrimination under the ADEA and ADA respectively. Each was covered by a collective bargaining agreement which
prohibited discrimination, required just cause for termination, and
contained a grievance and arbitration procedure for 75disputes involving interpretation and application of the agreement. One plaintiff's union had demanded arbitration of his grievance, while the
other's union had dropped the grievance." First, the court addressed
the question of whether the Federal Arbitration Act encompasses
collective bargaining agreements, noting that the question was criti77
cal in determining the court's jurisdiction. The court decided that
the contract was not excluded from the FAA, since the statutory exclusion applied only to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."78 On this issue, which has split the courts, the Seventh Circuit agreed with those courts who read the exclusion narrowly to encompass only employment contracts in the transportation

73. 113 F.3d 832 (1997).
74. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Company, 109 F.3d 354 (7th Or.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 294

(1997).
75. One contractual antidiscrimination clause referred to state and federal law while the
other did not. Id. at 356.
76. There was some dispute as to whether the grievance was dropped as a result of the employee's actions or the union's. Id.
77. Id. at 356-60.
78. Id.
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industry." The court then reached the second issue of whether a
collective bargaining agreement can compel arbitration of a federal
statutory discrimination claim.
Noting that resolution of the issue involved balancing "the interest in allowing unions and employers to establish a comprehensive
80
regime for the adjustment of employment disputes" and the
"interest in the effective enforcement of rights designed for the protection of workers" 81 in vulnerable groups, the court concluded that
the appropriate balance was to allow judicial litigation despite the
collective bargaining agreement's arbitration provision. Therefore,
the court denied the requested stay. Despite the employers' attempts to convince the court that a stay pending arbitration would
benefit both the employers and the employees, the court found that
the employees might well lose statutory rights were they required to
submit their claims to arbitration, even if later judicial litigation were
. d .82
perm1tte
The court offered three reasons supporting the balance it struck.
First, because the employees' rights under the collective bargaining
agreements were more limited than their statutory rights, they might
be required to litigate twice in order to obtain complete relief." Second, by arbitrating their claims, the employees would lose the right
to trial by jury. 84 Finally, as the Supreme Court recognized in both
Gilmer and Gardner-Denver, the union controls the grievance and
arbitration procedure. 85 While the duty of fair representation requires the union to represent the employee nondiscriminatorily and
in good faith, the union has broad discretion in determining whether
to arbitrate a grievance." Even if the duty is breached, the employee
must then file another lawsuit to vindicate his or her statutory
rights."7 Accordingly, it is inconsistent with the policy underlying the
employment discrimination statutes to allow the statutory rights of
the minority to be controlled by the majority." Forcing arbitration
1'L at 357-58.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). Charges of breach of the duty of fair
r~presentation can also be filed with the National Labor Relations Board in lieu of judicial litigahon. Id.
88. Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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under the collective bargaining agreement allows the union
(representing the majority) to waive the employees' 89individual rights
to a judicial forum to vindicate their statutory rights.

E. The Tenth Circuit
Less than two months after Pryner, the Tenth Circuit decided
that judicial litigation of a Title VII sexual harassment claim was not
barred by the plaintiff's failure to file a grievance under the collective
bargaining agreement." The court concluded that Gilmer distinguished arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement from individual arbitration agreements because of the concern about con91
flicts between group goals and individual rights. Labor arbitrators
interpret the agreement (private law), while employment
arbitrators
92
deciding statutory claims determine public law rights. In addition,
the court suggested that Gilmer did not apply outside the context of
the FAA, which the Tenth Circuit had held does not cover labor arbitration because of the Section 1 exclusion." Accordingly, GardnerDenver was the appropriate authority rather than Gilmer, requiring
rejection of the Defendant's argument."

F.

The Third Circuit

The Third Circuit, addressing the issue just over a month after
the Tenth Circuit, dismis~ing the plaintiff's race discrimination claim
brought under Title VII and Section 1981 because he failed to utilize
the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration procedure." Upon
89. Id. at 362-63.
90. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 97-232).
91. Id. at 1453-54.
92. Id. at 1454, citing Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77, 87-88 (1996). The court noted that it did not have
evidence regarding the scope of the arbitration clause, but that no argument had been put forth
that the agreement covered statutory claims. 112 F.3d at 1454 n.2. This caveat may suggest thal
the court would reach a different conclusion if the contract specifically incorporated statutory
claims under the arbitration provision. Cf Martin v. Dana Corp., 135 F.3d 765, 156 L.R.R.M.

(BNA) 3137 (3d Cir. 1997).
93. 112 F.3d at 1454.
94. Id.
95. Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 421 (1997), vacated, 114 F.3d 428 (3d Ch. 1997). On
July 1, 1997, the court voted to rehear the case en bane. 114 F.3d 428. On September 12, however, the court vacated that order and referred the case back to the panel for rehearing. 124 F.3<l
590. In its initial opinion, the Third Circuit concluded that the facts of the Martin case differed
from cases previously addressed by the courts in the labor arbitration context because the employee individually could compel arbitration. Accordingly, the concern about conflicting individ-

~
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1ts

rehearing, the same panel, in an unpublished opinion, concluded
without dissent that because the union maintained exclusive control
over the grievance procedure, Alexander. v. Gardner-Denver required
reversal of the district court's order dismissing the complaint for failure to arbitrate.

96
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In Brisentine v. Stone & Weber Engineering Corp., the Eleventh Circuit followed the majority view and reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. The
employee had filed an ADA claim challenging his termination with
the EEOC and subsequently in court, eschewing the contractual
grievance procedure on the advice of the union." The district court ·
dismissed Brisentine's ADA claim because of his failure to file a
grievance under the collectively bargained procedure." On review,
the Eleventh Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit, concluded that GardnerDenver was still good law and looked to the Gilmer Court's distinction between the two cases to determine whether100the case at bar
more closely resembled Gilmer or Gardner-Denver.
The court tested the facts of Brisentine against the three distinctions the Supreme Court drew between Gilmer and Gardner-Denver.
First, as in Gardner-Denver, the collective bargaining agreement in
Brisentine authorized the arbitrator to interpret only the contract,
not statutory claims. '01 Second, in both cases there was a potential
ual and group interests was not present and the court determined that Gilmer, rather than Gard_ner-Denver controlled. The court supported its decision by noting another "determinative factor"-the language of the collective bargaining agreement explicitly provided for arbitration of
<-_statutory discrimination claims. Id. at *21. The agreement stated:
Any and all claims regarding equal employment opportunity provided for under this
Agreement or under any federal, state or local fair employment practice law shall be
exclusively addressed by an individual employee or the Union under the grievance and
;-:·.· arbitration provision of this Agreement.
A ~trong dissent by Judge Scirica argued that the union could not waive the employee's statu.fJ nghts, particularly where the waiver precluded a jury trial. Id. at *25-26.
96. 135 F.3d 765, 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3137, 3139 (3d Cir. 1997).
>97. 117F.3d519(11thCir.1997).
/' 98. Id. at 521. The union representative told Brisentine that because his dispute "centered
,ound. his disability, he would be better off filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Oprtumty Commission ("EEOC") instead of pursuing his claim through the grievance proce-

l1·

re." Id.
' 99. Id.
.100. Id. at 522-26.
l01,. Id. at 524. The court found the agreements "materially identical" since both confined
arb1trat~r's jurisdiction to determining the interpretation of the agreement and both specified
i.t the arbitrator had no authority to alter the contractual provisions. Id.
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for differing interests between the union and the employee with re102
spect to the arbitration of statutory claims. Third, in Brisentine like
Gardner-Denver, the claim did not arise under the Federal Arbitra10
tion Act. '
Having concluded that the case closely resembled GardnerDenver, the court stated "[u]nless and until the Supreme Court overrules [Gardner-Denver], we are bound to apply that decision to a
case like this one that involves an exclusive remedy arbitration clause
in a collective bargaining agreement under which the arbitrator is
limited to resolving contractual claims, and the employee-claimant
is
104
not empowered to insist that his claim be arbitrated."
The court
noted its disagreement with the contrary conclusion of the Fourth
Circuit majority in Austin, stating that the reasoning of the dissent
was more persuasive."' Finally, the court set forth a three factor test
for determining whether an arbitration clause bars litigation of a
statutory claim:
[A] mandatory arbitration clause does not bar litigation of a federal statutory claim, unless three requirements are met. First, the
employee must have agreed individually to the contract containing
the arbitration clause-the union having agreed for the employee
during collective bargaining does not count. Second, the agreement must authorize the arbitrator to resolve federal statutory
claims-it is uot enough that the arbitrator can resolve contract
claims, eveu if factual issues arising from those claims overlap with
the statutory claim issues. Third, the agreement must give the employee the right to insist on arbitration if the federal statutory
106
claim is not resolved to his sati~factiou in any grievance process.

H. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit is the most recent circuit to weigh in on the
debate over arbitration of statutory claims under the collective bar-

102. In support of this conclusion, the court noted the union's advice to Brisentine to file an
EEOC charge rather than a grievance, suggesting that such advice might reflect a lack of enthusiasm for litigating his statutory claim in the gdevance procedure. Id. at 525. The court noted that
not only could Bdsentine not force arbitration of his claim, but also his union did not control that
decision. Id. Rather· a- council of unions made the determination and the cost of arbitration,
borne by the union, might provide an incentive to decline to arbitrate. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 526.
105. Id. See discussion of Austin supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text. The court also
noted that the case was factually distinguishable from Martin. See discussion of Martin, supra
notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
106. Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 526-27.
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gaining agreement. 107 After considering the analysis of the other circuits that have dealt with the question, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that "an employee whose only obligation to arbitrate is contained in
a collective bargaining agreement retains the right to obtain a judi108
cial determination of his rights under a statute such as the ADA."
The court concluded that Gilmer did not affect the holding of the
Court in Gardner-Denver that the union could not waive an individ10
ual's statutory right to litigate in a judicial forum. '
I.

District Courts

In those circuits which have not addressed the issue, district
courts have reached differing results, some following the Austin rationale and others rejecting it. In the First Circuit, the Massachusetts
District Court expressly declined to follow Austin in Lachance v.
Northeast Publishing, Inc.,1 10 noting "[l]astly, and most importantly, I
think the Fourth Circuit erred in failing to address the Supreme
Court's recognition of the continuing viability of GardnerDenver."111
Texas courts addressing the issue have reached differing results.
In Dickerson v. United Parcel Service, the court ordered plaintiff's
claimed stayed pending arbitration of his ADA claims under
the
112
collective bargaining agreement, which referenced the statute.
In
Hill v. American National Can Co. ,11 ' the court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to deny the employer's motion to dismiss plaintiff's AD A claim based on failure to exhaust the .collectively-bargained grievance procedure, although the agreement
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107. Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997).
108. Id. at 413.
'.,-, 109. Id. at 414. The Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the analysis of the Fourth Circuit in Austin. Id.
110. 965 F. Supp.177 (D. Mass.1997).
111. Id. at 189. Subsequently, the same court concluded in a case involving a New York
tock Exchange (NYSE) arbitration agreement that Congress intended to preclude enforcement
mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements in Title VII cases. Rosenberg v. Merrill,
ynch, Pierce, Fenner & Sinith, Inc., 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 681 (D. Mass. 1998). The
_ourt f~rther determined that "the employer's structural dominance of the NYSE arbitration
akes it an inadequate forum for the vindication of civil rights claims .... " Id. at 699. In one
.se, the First Circuit addressed the question of whether claims under the ADA and state antirimination law were preempted by the collective bargaining agreement which provided a
evance and arbitration procedure. Ralph v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 135 F.3d 166 {1st Cir.
,,98). The court rejected the employer's preemption argument, noting that statutory righls exist
ependently of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 171.
112. 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2471 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
yl13. 952 F. Supp. 398 (N.D. Tex. 1996 ).
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specified that it would be administered in accordance with the AD A.
The magistrate's opinion relied on the vitality of Gardner-Denver,
concluding that the individual's statutory rights were not waived by
114
A third Texas district court
the collective bargaining agreement.
agreed with the magistrate in Hill, declining to follow the Austin rationale.115
In the Ninth Circuit, a California district court rejected Austin,
concluding that it incorrectly interpreted the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and ignored the important distinction between individual
arbitration agreements and collective bargaining agreements."' The
Idaho District Court concluded that a union was not required to arbitrate FLSA claims before bringing suit, relying on Barrentine and
distinguishing Austin. 111 Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit had
previously determined that employees need not arbitrate FLSA
claims under a collective bargaining agreement because the statutory
provisions "are guarantees to individual workers that may not be
waived through collective bargaining.""' This decision may presage
the Ninth Circuit's position on the arbitration of discrimination
claims.
Having reviewed the divergent approaches of the courts to arbitration of statutory claims under collective bargaining agreements,
the next step is the analysis of these approaches under the existing
law of collective bargaining and nondiscrimination.
Ill. GARDNER-DENVER SURVIVES GILMER

As most of the courts of appeals have recognized, Gilmer expressly distinguished Gardner-Denver rather than overruling it, ei-

114. Id. at 402-08.

115. Bush v. Carrier Air Conditioning, 940 F. Supp. 1040, 1045-46 (E.D. Tex. 1996). The
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana distinguished Austin in refusing to dismiss a Title VII claim. Bynes v. Ahrenkiel Ship Management, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 485
(W.D. La. 1996). The court decided that since the plaintiffs could not compel arbitration and the
union had dropped their grievance, they had exhausted any arbitration opportunity and could
proceed in court. Id. at 487.
116. Buckley v. Gallo Sales Co., 949 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
117. Albertson's, Inc. v. United Food & Co1nmercial Workers, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4554
(D. Idaho March 10, 1997).
118. Local 246 Utility Workers Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292, 297 (9th Cir.
1996). Subsequent to the completion of this article, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1450 (9th Circuit 1998) that Congress inlended to prohibit compulsory _arbitration of Title VII claims. While Duffield did not involve a
collectively-bargained arbitration agreement, it would appear to apply in that context, particularly because the court criticized the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Austin.
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ther implicitly or explicitly."' At most, the Gilmer Court rejected
Gardner-Denver's mistrust of arbitration as a vehicle for resolving
statutory claims. 120 The remaining rationale of Gardner-Denver, as
explicated in Gilmer, provides a persuasive argument for reversing
121
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Wright.
The Gardner-Denver Court recognized that labor arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement differs from arbitration of
individual contractual or statutory claims. Because labor arbitration
substitutes for the strike, not for litigation, it is an extension of the
collective bargaining process. As a result, it is controlled by the union and great deference is given to the union's decisions regarding
123
whether and how to arbitrate,122 and to the arbitrator's decision.
This deference furthers the federal labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining and peaceful resolution of labor disputes, but it is
not designed to vindicate employees' statutory rights.
Because of these differences between labor arbitration and individual arbitration of statutory claims, construing arbitration clauses
in collective bargaining agreements to waive individual statutory
119. See Gilnier, 500 U.S. at 33-5.
120. Id. at 34 n.5 .
121. While this article focuses on the continuing viability of Gardner-Denver and the distinction between individual agreements to arbitrate and collective bargaining agreements, there ar_e
other bases on which the Supreme Court might rule. There is a strong argument that the Fedcithl
Arbitration Act does not cover arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements. The
courts of appeals have disagreed on this issue. Cf Pryner, 109 F.3d at 377 (FAA excludes from
coverage only employment contracts in the transportation industry); Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1454
(FAA does not cover collective bargaining agreements.) The Fourth Circuit in Austin noted
prior circuit precedent holding that the FAA does not apply to collective bargaining agreements,
but relied on the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes as expressed in the Steelworkers Trilogy to support its decision. 78 F.3d at 879-81. Wright relied on Austin. Thus, it is not
clear that the Supreine Court will resolve the issue of the scope of the FAA in Wright. Professor
Stone argues that the Fourth Circuit could only be relying on the FAA since Section 301 preemption is only available to require arbitration of state law claims. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Eniployment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s,
·7~ DENY. U. L. REV. 1017, 1035 (1996). For a thorough discussion of the FAA's Section 1 exclusion, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), see Matthew W. Finkin, Workers' Contracts Under the United States Ar;·. ·:bitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996);
'see also Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687, 731-42 (1997);
Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the
0;Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. l, 15-28 (1996).
\./ · . !he Court might also conclude that the AD A evidences an intent to preclude waiver of the
JUdici~l forum. There is substantial support in the legislative history for such a conclusion. See
.<:Jrodm, supra at 30-32; Ann C. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act in the Unionized
..0 rkplace, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 621~25 (1994). Given the Court's contrary ruling in Gilmer
th respect to the ADEA, however, such a result seems unlikely.
·; · 122. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
123. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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rights is inconsistent with both the goals of national labor policy and
124
the goals of antidiscrimination statutes.

A. Finding Union Waivers of Employee Statutory Rights is
Inconsistent with National Labor Policy and Statutory
Nondiscrimination Rights
A key distinction between the Fourth Circuit's decisions barring
litigation based on the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration
clause and the contrary decisions of the other circuits is the courts'
conclusion regarding the union's authority to waive employee statutory rights. The Fourth Circuit determined that because a union can
waive employee rights provided in the National Labor Relations
Act, such as the right to strike,"' the union can also waive the right to
a judicial forum, including the right to a jury trial under Title VII
and other discrimination laws. Gardner-Denver suggests otherwise.
It is true, of course, that a uuion may waive certain statutory rights
related to collective activity, such as the right to strike.... These
rights are conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished
by the union as the collective-bargaining ageut to obtain economic
benefits for union members. Title VU, ou the other haud, stands
on a plainly different ground; it concerns not majoritariau processes, but an individual's right to equal employment opportunities.
Title Vll's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional
command that each employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the ·rights conferred can form no part of the
collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII. In
these circumstances, an employee's
rights under Title VII are uot
126
susceptible of prospective waiver.
124. This article takes no position on whether arbitration of statutory claims is appropriate or
effective in nonunion settings. For further discussion of the arguments favoring and opposing
such arbitration, see the authorities cited supra note 121 and infra notes 126, 166, 198, 201. See
also Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 383184 (1996); Walter J. Gershenfeld, Preemployment Dispute Arbitration Agreements: Yes, No and Maybe, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 245

(1996).
125. 29u.s.c.§163 (1994).
126. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51-52 (citations omitted). Although this language might be
read as precluding an individual waiver as well as a waiver by the union, the subsequent decision
in Gilmer makes clear than an individual can agree prospectively to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims. Professor Samuel Estreicher argued persuasively in Arbitration of Employrnent
Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 781 (1990), written before Gilmer was decided, that "the Gardner-Denver line of authority is best understood in terms of the collective
bargaining agent's lack of authority to compromise individual employee entitlements flowing
from extra-contractual sources."
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The Gilmer Court determined that the employee could knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to a judicial forum for litigation
of statutory claims, but it did not reject the Gardner-Denver Court's
analysis regarding union waiver. Indeed, while the Gilmer Court did
not expressly discuss union waiver, the concern expressed in Gardner-Denver underlay the Gilmer Court's distinction of that case,
which focused on the potential conflicts between collective rights and
individual rights. 127 A thorough analysis of the relevant labor law
and antidiscrimination cases will demonstrate why finding a union
waiver of employee statutory rights is inconsistent with both.
(

l.

Unions Cannot Waive Individual Statutory Rights Because of
Potential Conflicts of Interest

As noted by the Gardner-Denver Court, the Supreme Court has
recognized that unions can waive employees' statutory rights uhder
the NLRA so long as the waiver is clear and unmistakable."' Such
waivers are permissible because the union was freely selected to represent the employees and is governed by the doctrine of fair representation."' The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between
economic rights and rights that relate to the choice of bargaining representative."0 The former can be waived while the latter carmot because, in the latter situation, the union has a self interest which might
131
lead to a waiver that is not in the interest of the employees. This
point was emphasized by Justice Stewart concurring in part and dissenting in part, in Magnavox."' "Although the union is deemed to
represent all employees in the bargaining unit, both pro-union and
anti-union, and may waive important Section 7 rights in the course of
collective bargaining, presumably in return for management concessions on other fronts, this authority cannot extend to rights with respect to which the union and the individual employees have essen133
tially conflicting interests."
While the focus of the Court in these decisions was on rights
under the National Labor Relations Act, the conflict analysis is
127. Id. at 35.
128. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). A waiver of a statutory right will not be lightly implied. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 u:s. 270, 283-89
(1955).
129. 460 U.S. at 705, quoting NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974).
130. Id. al 705-06.
131. Id. at 706; NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974).
132. 416 U.S. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
133. Id.
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equally applicable to other statutory rights. Not only is there
an in134
herent tension between collective and individual interests, but also
135
given the history of discrimination on the part of some unions, i~
would be anomalous indeed to conclude that those unions could
waive the rights of union-represented employees to a judicial forum,
including a jury trial, for litigation of discrimination claims. While
many unions actively support civil rights, the rule would apply
equally to those few that not only do not support employees in their
discrimination cases against employers, but discriminate themselves.
It is no answer to say that employees can sue unions that discriminate, because negotiating contractual protection against discrimination will certainly not be found to be discriminatory, and the duty of
fair representation limits the union's liability for failing to pursue
136
discrimination grievances.
Furthermore, some discrimination cases involve conflicts between union-represented employees, such as sexual harassment allegations by one employee against a co-employee."' Such cases inherently contain the potential for a conflict of interest between the
harassed employee and the union. This is not to suggest that a union
cannot effectively represent an employee in an arbitration involving
co-employee harassment, but only that the employee should have the
right, where the potential for conflicting interests exists, to choose
litigation to vindicate statutory rights."' Thus, as the Seventh Circuit
134. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35:•

135. See, e.g., Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 477 (1986).
136. See infra notes 140-65 and accompanying text.
137. The employer is liable for sexual harassment by co-employees if it knew or should have
known about the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action. See, e.g., Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-83 (9th Cir. 1991). For cases where unions have arbitrated claims involving sexual harassment, see Western Lake Superior Sanitary Dist. and Minnesota Arrowhead
Dist. Local 96, AFSCME, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 289 (1990) (Boyer, Arb.) (employer justified in
suspending two male employees based on sexual harass1nent of female employee); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. and UAW Local 1093, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 585 (1989) (Woolf, Arb.) Gust cause
existed to discharge employee who violated management order designed to stop sexual harassment of female employee); EZ Communications, Inc., and AFTRA, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1097
(1998) (Talarico, Arb.) (female employee was justified in walking off the job based on sexual
harassment). Notably, however, unions are frequently in the position of challenging the employer's discipline of harassers. See Western Lake, supra; McDonnell Douglas, supra. For a discussion of some of the concerns relating to arbitration of sexual harassment cases, see Tim Bornstein, Arbitration of Sexual Harassment, in ARBITRATION 1991: THE CHANGING FACE OF
ARBITRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FOURTII ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 109-20 (Gladys w. Gruenberg, ed. 1992);
Helen R. Neuborne, Comment, in id. at 120-32.
138. Jn addition to sexual harassment cases, employee rights may conflict in other cases as
well, such as affirmative action issues involving conflicts between the rights of minority workers
and more senior majority workers and Americans with Disabilities Act cases where the employee is seeking reasonable accommodation which conflicts with the rights of other employees
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concluded in Pryner, the union, representing the majority, should
not be permitted to waive an employee's right to a judicial forum,
particularly where the employee is a member of a minority group
139
that has been historically oppressed.
2. The Duty of Fair Representation Does Not Adequately Protect
Employee Statutory Rights
While the union is governed by the duty of fair representation,
which provides the employee some protection from discriminatory
treatment by the union, 140 compliance with the duty of fair representation does not insure full vindication of the employee's statutory
rights. The doctrine of fair representation does not require the union to arbitrate every case. 141 The union is vested with the authority
to determine which cases to pursue so long as the authority is exer142
Thus, the
cised without hostility, discrimination or arbitrariness.
union can determine not to arbitrate a discrimination claim because,
143
in good faith, it doubts the merits of the claim, although the union
officers making that decision may have no expertise in statutory discrimination law. The union can use a lay representative, rather than
an attorney to represent a grievant in arbitration, although the representative may have little or no expertise in statutory discrimination
issues. The duty of fair representation does not require the union to
provide the employee with an attorney for the arbitration, even in
complex cases,144 nor does it prevent the union from excluding the
under the collective bargaining agreement. See Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984) (Supreme Court overturned district court order to modify seniority system to protect from
layoff minority workers hired as a result of affirmative action provisions in a consent decree settling a Title VII claim); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996) (ADA
does not require accommodation that violates the seniority system at the expense of other employees).

139. 109 F.3d at 362-63.
140. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.171, 177 (1967) ("the exclusive agent's statutory authority to
represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of
all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct"); Airline Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill,
~99. U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (reiterating the Vaca standard and holding that it applies to contract negot~atlon as well as administration). Perhaps ironically, the duty of fair representation was judicially developed to remedy racial discrimination on the part of unions in representing employees.
See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); TWlstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
141. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191.
142. Id.
143. Id.
c· 144. See Patterson v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 959, 121 F.3d 1345, 1350 (9th
rr. 1997); Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1985); Del Casal v.
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employee's private attorney from the arbitration. Furthermore, the
union's lay representatives will not be held to the same professional
146
standar d s as an attorney.
The arbitration need not be equivalent to a judicial proceeding
to meet the union's duty of fair representation. For example, in
Walden v. Local 71, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the
plaintiff employee alleged that the union breached its duty of fair
representation by failing to consult a lawyer in preparation for the
hearing, by failing to object to hearsay evidence introduced at the
hea,dng, and by failing to raise a due process argument in support of
the claim that he was discharged in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.'" The Fourth Circuit, the same court that relegated Austin to the grievance procedure for her Title VII and ADA
claims, found no breach of the duty of fair representation, stating
"[a]n arbitration is not a court of law and need not be conducted like
one. Neither lawyers nor strict adherence to judicial rules of evidence are necessary complements of industrial peace and stability148
the ultimate goals of arbitration. "
Similarly, in Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., the plaintiff alleged
that the union breached its duty of fair representation by using a
union representative who spent only one and a half hours preparing
for the arbitration, did not call key witnesses, failed to mtroduce
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981) (the union
may decide under what conditions it will provide counSel, but may not base such a determination
on t):ie employee's lack of union membership); Walden v. Local 71, Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 468
F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972) (union did not breach its duty by failing to consult an attorney and using
instead a lay union representative to arbitrate the claim); Malin, supra note 92, at 87.
145. See Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1995) (unions have the
right to limit the role of outside attorneys in the grievance and arbitration procedure); Castelli,
752 F.2d at 1483 (union not required to permit employee's attorney in arbitration so long as exclusion not discriminatory); Malin, supra note 92, at 87 n.45. Indeed the employer is not required
to meet with the employee's counsel or arbitrate with the employee's counsel where the union
has exclusive representation rights, even where the union authorized such arbitration. See General Drivers Local 984 v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 23 F.3d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir. 1994); Malone v.
United States Postal Serv., 526F.2d1099, 1106 (6th Cir.1975).
146. See, e.g., Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 890 F.2d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 1989) (where
the court, noting it was unreasonable to expect a union in arbitration to meet the same standards
as an attorney in a court of law, stated "[w]e have no doubt that certain acts or omissions by a
union official representing a grievant, while actionable if done by an attorney, would not constitute a breach of the union duty of fair representation"); Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 700 F.2d
457, 458 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding it would defeat the arbitral goals of informality and speedy
resolution to hold a union to the standard of a reasonable attorney in a duty of fair representation
case).
147. 468 F.2d at 197.
148. Id. By 1996, in Austin, the Fourth Circuit apparently lost this recognition of the goals of
labor arbitration.
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relevant evidence, and failed to cross examine the employer's witnesses effectively.14' Like the Fourth Circnit, the Ninth Circnit found
no breach of the duty of fair representation, noting that the conduct
was at most negligence, or tactical mistakes which did not breach the
150
duty of fair representation.
Even where the union employs an attorney for the grievance
proceeding, the fair representation standard may be applied."' In
Garcia, the plaintiff based his claim of breach of the duty of fair representation on the attorney's conduct; specifically, failure to interview or present testimony of a particular witness, failure to call the
grievant as a witness, failure to review a videotape of evidence, and
failure to call any witnesses or to present grievant's side of the
story."' Applying the wide range of reasonableness standard, the
court concluded that the lawyer's actions were strategy decisions
which were not so irrational as to breach the duty of fair representation.153 The court stated:
Stanton's strategy and presentation "inay not have been Garcia's
preferred approach, and Stanton may not have been as thorough as
he might have been. However, Garcia does not prove a disregard
for his case sufficient to meet the standard imposed on the Union.
Stanton pursued a rational strategy with sufficient competence and
vigor to meet the burden of "some minimal investigation of employee grievances," and showed no "egregions disregard for
union
154
members' rights constituting a breach of the union's duty."
The Garcia court, in holding that the plaintiff established no injury from any misrepresentation by the union regarding his right to
consult an attorney, went on to state that the union's attorney was
155
The
not required to follow any advice from plaintiff's counsel.
court recognized that the union lawyer may have chosen his strategy
out of a concern that an alternative strategy would damage the union's credibility and indicated that the plaintiff could not have com149. 752 F.2d at 1482.
150. Id. at 1483.
151. See Garcia, 58 F.3d at 1178 (noting that a duty of fair representation case is quite different from a malpractice action and the lawyer need only act within a wide range of reasonable~es~)_. See also Peterson v. Kennedy, 771F.2d1244, 1256 (9th Cir. 1985) (union attorney has no
liab1hty to individual grievants for malpractice independent of the duty of fair representation) .
. 152. Garcia, 58 F.3d at 1178. Garcia also claimed that the union prevented Garcia from hiring
his own attorney. Id.
~5.3. Id. at 1177-79. Jn Patterson, the court similarly refused to question a union's strategy
dec1s1on in arbitration so long as it was supported by a reasoned explanation. 121 F.3d at 1349-

50.
154. Garcia, 58 F.3d at 1179 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 1180.
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pelled a different choice."'
Moore v. Duke Power Co.,"' a recent North Carolina case, demonstrates the limits of the duty of fair representation in insuring that
employees' statutory nondiscrimination rights are protected under
the Austin rule. The plaintiff, Moore, was terminated by the employer, allegedly because of his disability."' He filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement and a complaint of disability
discrimination with the Office of Contract Federal Compliance Programs. His lawsuit alleging violations of the ADA and state law was
stayed pending arbitration. The union arbitrated his termination
grievance but refused to raise the disability discrimination claims in
the arbitration, although it had allegedly promised to do so. The
union al~o prevented the plaintiff's attorney from participating in the
arbitration. Jhe arbitrator found the plaintiff had been discharged
for just cause.
Based on Austin, the court granted summary judgment for the
employer, concluding that the plaintiff arbitrated his claim and lost
and that the union's failure to raise the disability discrimination argument did not violate the duty of fair representation. The court determined that 'a reference in the preamble of the collective bargaining agreement to discrimination on the basis of handicap indicated
that the agreement was intended to cover such claims. Thus Moore
was bound to arbitrate. He lost and was bound by the result, absent
evidence that the union's conduct was "'grossly deficient' or in reck159
The court concluded:
less disregard of the member's rights. "
"Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence establishes that the Union, at arbitration, either forgot to raise plaintiff's concerns about disability discrimination or instead made a strategic decision not to pursue that aspect of plaintiff's grievance
regarding his termination. At best, such evidence establishes that the
Union was negligent in its representation of plaintiff or merely made
a strategic error." 160 Accordingly, the Austin rule precluded Moore's
156. Id. at 1180-81. "A private attorney would have had no power to force Stanton to follow
a strategy that Stanton found detrimental to the union." Id. at 1181.
157. 971 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.N.C.1997).
158. Id. at 979. All facts are taken from the court's opinion. The plaintiff also complained of
discrimination in various acts which preceded his termination, including a demotion, several
transfer denials, and a suspension. Id. at 980.
159. Id. at 982, citing Ash v. United Parcel Serv., 800 F.2d 409, 411 (4th Cir.1986).
160. Id. at 985. Plaintiff's claim relating to his suspension was dismissed because the union
accepted the employer's contention, which "may have been wrong," that the grievance was untimely. Id. at 983. The court determined that the union's failure to investigate the employer's
claim was not grossly deficient conduct. Id. -'
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disability discrimination claim from hearing in any forum because of
his inability to meet the demanding standard required to prove that
the union breached its duty of fair representation.
These cases demonstrate that the duty of fair representation
does not adequately protect the employees' rights under the discrimination statutes. The employee does not have the right to legal
representation, has no control over strategy decisions in arbitration,
may be represented by an individual with little or no knowledge of
statutory discrimination law, may have an arbitrator (selected by the
union and the company without her input) with little or no knowledge of discrimination law,161 and may have no right to any discovery."' Indeed, the employee's claim may never be heard in any forum if the union decides not to arbitrate or arbitrates but does not
raise the discrimination claim. Furthermore, the typical local union
161. The problem of arbitral familiarity with discrimination law may apply equally to individual arbitration, but at least in that forum, the individual Participates in selecting the arbitrator
and has the opportunity to select a knowledgeable arbitrator, although she may lack the information necessary to make such participation effective. See infra note 243. A 1975 survey of arbitrators indicated that only half kept current on Title VII issues and only 14o/o believed that they
could define accurately basic employment discrintination concepts. Harry Edwards, Arbitration
of En1ploy1nent Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, in PROCEEDINGS OF TiiE TwENTY~
EIGHTH NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59 (1976). Nevertheless, 72o/o concluded that
they were competent to decide legal issues in employment discrimination cases. Id. The Due
Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes arising out of the Employment Relationship recognized that "the existing cadre of labor and employment mediators and
arbitrators, some lawyers, some not, although skilled in conducting hearings and familiar with the
employ1nent milieu is unlikely, without special training, to consistently possess knowledge of the
statutory environment in which these disputes arise,, .. " See Prototype Agreement on Job Bias
Dispute Resolution, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91 at E-11(May11, 1995) [hereinafter Prototype
Agreen1ent]. The Due Process Protocol has been endorsed by the National Academy of Arbitrators Board of Governors and by union and management representatives of the Employment and
Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association. Academy Board Endorses ADR Task
F_orce Protocol, 149 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 161 (June 5, 1995). In recommending more extensive use of voluntary arbitration to resolve employment disputes, the Dunlop Commission enc~uraged the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to establish a training program on
discrimination law for arbitrators and to adopt standard training requirements for arbitrators
marketing their services for resolving discrimination disputes. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF TIIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
reprinted in Daily Lab, Rep. (BNA) No. 6 at d55(January10, 1995).
162. FRANK ELKO URI & EDNA ASPER ELKO URI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 304-310 (4th
ed. 1985). The absence of discovery is not unique to collectively bargained arbitration proce:, _dur~s. The Gilmer Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that limited discovery rendered arbiJration of statutory claims inappropriate, noting that by agreeing to arbitrate, the plaintiff traded
,t,he more extensive judicial procedures for a simpler, more expeditious proceeding. 500 U.S. at
\31.. ~e Court left open the possibility, however, that discovery might be so limited as to deny a
:plamtiff a fair opportunity to present her claims. Id. Some "discovery" is available in the grievce. ~rocedure using the NLRA right to request and receive information relevant to contract
~stration. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). The right belongs to the
!lton rather than the employee, however, and the union is accountable to the employee only
ough the duty of fair representation. See Malin, supra note 92, at 87.
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has limited financial resources for pursuing complex discrimination
cases which may require extensive research in order to gather evidence of discrimination.
The limitations on the union's accountability to employees in
handling grievances are appropriate where the contractual grievance
procedure serves the purpose of developing private law governing
the workplace."' As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized,
grievance arbitration is a part of the collective bargaining process,
not a substitute for litigation. 164 Using arbitration, the parties refine
and flesh out their agreement resolving issues left open by the general language of the agreement.'" Thus, union control over the procedure, with limited recourse by the employees, insures that the system of collective bargaining can operate as Congress intended,
leading to industrial peace rather than warfare. A determination
that the union's agreement to the arbitration procedure not only
waives the right to strike and provides a method for peacefully determining private law, but also waives the employees' statutory right
to litigate and establishes a forum for determining public law, does
not further the goal of industrial peace. In addition, it is inconsistent
with the purposes underlying the discrimination statutes.
3. Finding A Waiver Based on A Collective Bargaining Agreement
Penalizes Employees for Exercising Their Statutory Right to Bargain
Collectively and Does Not Meet the Stringent Standard Required for
Such a Waiver
An employee who chooses a collective bargaining representative
is on notice that the representative will bargain for the employee's
terms and conditions of employment. Similarly, an employee who
signs an individual agreement with his employer to arbitrate statu163. Malin, supra note 92, at 87.
164. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Indeed, the grievance and arbitration procedure is the
quid pro quo for the agreement not to strike. The strength of this rationale is demonstrated by
the Court's decision in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962),
where the Court held that the very existence of a grievance and arbitration procedure in an
agreement implied a promise by the union not to strike during the term of the contract. For additional discussion of differences between labor arbitration and arbitration of statutory disputes,
see Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Dispute~·,
1995 U. ILL. L, REV. 635; G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes:
When is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509,
511-15 (1990).
165. St. Antoine, supra note 10, at 1140, 1161.
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tory claims is on notice that arbitration will be the forum for resolu166
In contrast, the
tion of employment-related statutory disputes.
employee whose union negotiates a collective bargaining agreement
containing a prohibition on discrimination and a standard grievance
and arbitration provision is extremely unlikely to be aware, much
less agree, that the union has negotiated away his right to litigate a
statutory discrimination claim. Indeed, the union may be unaware
167
that it is doing so.
The impact of the determination of waiver is analogous to the
impact of the state law provisions found preempted by the Supreme
Court in Livadas v. Bradshaw."' In Livadas, the Court held that the
NLRA preempted the California statutory provision which denied
enforcement of state wage claims filed by employees covered by collective bargaining agreements with arbitration provisions."' According to the Court, the state law impermissibly burdened employees who chose to exercise their federal right to bargain collectively
166. Gilme1~ 500 U.S. at 32-3. Furthermore, the employee retains the right to prove that the
waiver of a judicial forum was not knowing. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304-05
{9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995). For criticism of mandatory arbitration of statutory clahns in the nonunion context, see NEIU's Position on Mandatory Arbitration of Eniployment Disputes, l EMPLOYEE RTS & EMPWYMENT POLICY J. 263 (1997); EEOC Policy Statement
on Mandatory Arbitration, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133 at d30 (July 11, 1997); Michele
L. Giovagnoli, To Be or Not to Be? Recent Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the
Employnient Arena, 64 UMKC L. REV. 547 (1996); Grodin, supra note 121; David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing S1nall Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in An Age
of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 33; Stone, supra note 121; Brian K. Van Engen,
Post-Gilnier Developments in Mandatory Arbitration: The Expansion of Mandatory Arbitration
for Statutory Claims and the Congressional Effort to Reverse the Trend, 21 J. CORP. L. 391 (1996);
John L. Zalusky, A Union View of Nonrepresented Employees' Grievance Systems, in LABOR
ARBITRATION UNDER FIRE 182 (James L. Stern & Joyce M. Najita, eds. 1997).
167. Certainly it is unlikely that the union consciously intended to bargain for such a waiver
for the union has no reason to seek such a waiver and many reasons not to do so, not the least of
Which is subjecting itself to additional fair representation claims. See infra notes 191-211 and accompanying text.
168. 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
;:->: 169. Id. at 109. Notably, the court in Livadas, reaffirmed the distinction between Gilmer and
Gardner-Denver while emphasizing their "basic consistency":
In ~ol?ing that an agreement to arbitrate an Age Discrimination in Employment Act
claim is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, Gilmer emphasized its basic
consistency with our unanimous decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
(19'.4), permitting a discharged employee to bring a Title VII claim, notwithstanding his
h~v~ng ~lready grieved the dismissal under a collective-bargaining agreement. Gilmer
distmgu1shed Gardner-Denver as relying, inter alia, on: the "distinctly separate nature of
···contractual and statutory rights" (even when both were "violated as a result of the
same factual occurrence"), 415 U.S. at 50; the fact that a labor "arbitrator has authority
to res~lve only questions of contractual rights." Id., at 53-54; and the concern that in
coll~chve-bargaining arbitration, "the interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit." Id. at 58

n.19.
127 n.21.
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and to negotiate an arbitration provision by denying them the protection of a state statnte.170 The Court not only concluded that the
state law was preempted, but found that Livadas was entitled to pursue redress under Section 1983 because of the state statute's interference with her statutory rights to bargain collectively and to agree to
an arbitration clause. 171 Similarly, under the rule of the Austin Court,
the employee is penalized by losing her judicial forum because she is
represented by a union which has negotiated an arbitration provision. Unlike Austin, however, in Livadas there was no claim that the
union waived the employee's statutory right nor was there an indication that the parties considered the statutory claim to be covered by
the arbitration provision, so the Court did not have to consider
172
whether such a waiver would be effective. Nevertheless, the Court
stated that such a waiver would have to "be clear and unmistakable
173
for a court even to consider whether it could be given effect."
The National Labor Relations Board, with approval of the Supreme Court, has applied this stringent standard for waiver of National Labor Relations Act rights."' And as the Livadas Court
noted, the standard is appropriate for union waivers of other statutory rights as well. 175 Negotiation of a contractual antidiscrimination
provision, even one which incorporates discrimination statutes, and
an arbitration procedure for contract enforcement cannot meet this
stringent waiver standard. Therefore, even if a union waiver of
statutory rights is permissib.le, none should be found based solely on
the negotiation of contractual protection of statutory rights.
Under NLRA precedent, neither general contractual provisions
nor bargaining history that does not evidence a full discussion, conscious exploration and conscious yielding of position can waive a
statutory right."' Several examples illustrate the Supreme Court's
170. Id. at 123. The state attempted to justify its statutory inaction on the theory that Section
301 preempts state law claims which depend on interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). As the Suprcn1e
Court noted, however, the state's position was not limited to such circumstances and, indeed, Livadas' claim did not depend on interpretation of the agreement. 512 U.S. at 124.
171. Id. at 132.
172. Id. at 125.
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983); Johnson-Bateman Co., 295
N.L.R.B.180 (1989). See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
175. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125. In addition to Metropolitan Edison, the Court cited its earlier
decision in Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410 n.9, where it stated that union waiver of an employee's slale
statutory right would have to be clear and unmistakable before the Court would conclude that
such a waiver was intended.
176. Johnson-Bateman, Co., 295 N.L.R.B. at 184-85.
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reluctance to infer a waiver. In Metropolitan Edison, two arbitrators
had interpreted the contractual no strike clause to permit disparately
severe punishment of union officials for their participation
in unlaw177
Despite
ful strikes because of their duty to uphold the contract.
the two decisions, the union failed to seek modification of the contractual no strike clause. When the employer subsequently disciplined union officials more harshly for violating the no strike clause,
the union then filed unfair labor practice charges alleging that the
employer's action constituted unlawful discrimination under the
NLRA. The employer argued that the union had waived the officials' statutory right by acquiescing in the prior arbitrators' interpretations of the no strike clause. The Court disagreed, looking for
much more to find a waiver-either an arbitration decision stating
that the contract clearly and unmistakably imposed an express duty
on union officials to end unlawful strikes or a clear and consistent
pattern of arbitration decisions and circumstances under which it
could be said that the parties incorporated those decisions into the
collective bargaining agreement."' Similarly, in Mastro Plastics, the
Court concluded that contract language agreeing to refrain from any
strike or work stoppage during the term of the agreement did not
waive the right to strike over unfair labor practices during the term
179
of the agreement.
This stringent standard for waivers insures that employee rights
are not waived without express intent to do so. Like the duty of fair
representation, this standard protects employees. No such stringent
standard was applied by the courts finding waivers of the right to litigate a statutory discrimination claim before a jury. Even the clear
intent to incorporate such statutory claims in the contract does not
establish an intent to waive litigation of them, particularly in light of
the existing precedent of Gardner-Denver. And certainly the union's
negotiation of a broad arbitration provision without inclusion of contractual language regarding statutory discrimination law cannot establish an intent to waive litigation of statutory claims.
;
The Supreme Court has required that waiver of statutory rights
1 0
>by individuals be knowing and voluntary. ' The Austin Court ap'· parently concluded that such a waiver existed because the agreement
was voluntary, finding her to be a party to the agreement solely by
460 U.S. at 709. All facts are taken from the Court's decision.
Id.
350 U.S. at 281.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 52 n.15.
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virtue of her membership in the bargaining unit. " The Court offered no support for this conclusion and it is contrary to the principles of labor and employment law.rn' The employee's rights under
the agreement can be contractually limited, particularly the right to
arbitrate grievances. For example, where the individual employee
does not have a contractual right to invoke arbitration, the employee
may not compel arbitration.183 The same is true where the court concludes that the employee is attempting to arbitrate a broad policy is184
sue that directly concerns only the union.
Furthermore, the
agreement is negotiated by the union, and may or may not be ratified
by the employees. 185 Even where ratification is required, it occurs by
majority vote. An individual employee opposed to a particular provision is bound by it if the contract is ratified despite her opposition.
Accordingly, even if the employee's waiver of a judicial forum was
knowing, it cannot be voluntary since a contract waiving such rights
can be negotiated and approved despite her opposition. Where collective rights are involved, this scheme furthers the statutory goals of
collective bargaining and labor peace, but it may frustrate the goal of
protecting employees from discrimination.
4. Compelling Arbitration of Statutory Claims Under a Collective
Bargaining Agreement Does Not Merely Substitute A Different
Forum for Hearing the Discrimination Claim
In holding that Gilmer was required to arbitrate his statutory
ADEA claim, the Supreme' Court, quoting Mitsubishi, stated '"[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits
to their
186
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.'" Given the
differences between labor arbitration and commercial arbitration,
however, this representation simply does not hold true in labor arbi181. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885-86.
182. See H. David Kelly, Jr., An Argument for Retaining the Well Established Distinction Between Contractual and Statutory Claims in Labor Arbitration, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 65
(1997).
183. See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d

CiI. 1962).
184. See Brown v. Sterling Aluminum Products Corp., 365 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967) (employer relocation is a broad policy issue and the employee cannot
compel arbitration absent the union).
185. Ratification is not required by law. See ".MARTIN H. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
WITHINTiiE UNION 60, 378 (1988).
186. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Ply1nouth,
Inc .• 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
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tration. As noted, labor arbitration is not a substitute for litigation.
Instead, it is a substitute for the strike. It is designed to be a continuation of the collective bargaining process, not to litigate individual statutory claims. Accordingly, it has characteristics that render it
inappropriate for that purpose.
Unlike the arbitration agreement in Gilmer, the individual covered by a collectively bargained arbitration provision is relegated to
a forum in which she does not control her claim. She cannot decide
whether or not to arbitrate and may be lawfully precluded from arb.itrating her claim. She cannot participate in choosing the arbitrator."'
If the claim is arbitrated, she cannot choose her own representative
and the union-designated representative may have no expertise in
statutory claims. She cannot make strategy decisions or determine
which arguments to raise or which witnesses to call in support of her
claim. While such limitations are appropriate to effectuate the national labor policy of collective representation, they render labor arbitration an ineffective substitute for litig11tion of individual claims.
These differences are not the challenges to the adequacy of arbitra188
tion generally rejected by the Gilmer court, but differences relevant
to labor arbitration in particular. Moreover, they are differences
which may adversely affect the employee's statutory right to be free
from discrimination. Indeed, they may prevent the employee's discrimination claim from receiving any hearing, thus insuring that she
will receive no remedy for any discrimination."'

B. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Imposes a Duty of Fair
Representation on the Union for Statutory Claims
The Fourth Circuit's decisions in Austin and Wright expand the
of fair representation beyond its intended application. Unions

' L:.:..187 · Of course, the union could involve the employee in decision-making but it is not re8Urred to do so and may be concerned about setting such a precedent as employees with non··ftJ_atutory claims may then demand more extensive involvement in the process.
188. 500 U.S. at 30-33.
189. .see, e.g., Moore v. Duke Power Co., 971 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.N.C. 1997). Section 301
:e.emption also deprives unionized employees of certain causes of action under state law and
been criticized for that reason. See Bales, supra note 121, at 718; l(atherine Van Wezel
e, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralisni: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights
t~e New Deal Collective Bargaining Systen1, 59 U. OII. L. REV. 575, 605-20 (1992). Despite
Cl.Sm of the pree1nption doctrine, it at least serves the purpose of insuring uniform interpreta-~ collective bargaining agree1nents, long held to be an important goal of national labor polocal 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The Austin rule furthers no
goal.
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chosen by a majority of employees under the NLRA procedures,"
have both the right to exclusive representation and the corresponding duty of fair representation."' Unions have years of experience in
negotiating collective bargaining agreements, administering contracts, including arbitration of contractual claims, and complying with
the duty of fair representation. Relegation of statutory claims to the
contractual arbitration procedure arguably expands the right of exclusive representation and almost certainly expands the duty of fair
representation to include statutory claims.
Because the duty of fair representation arises out of the right of
exclusive representation,1 92 it has been confined 193to matters on which
Although unions
the union exclusively represents the employee.
have often negotiated contractual provisions prohibiting discrimination,"' the union does not exclusively represent the employee with
respect to statutory employment discrimination claims. The employee can file and pursue such a claim even if the union opposes the
filing. The employee can settle the claim with the employer without
union input or approval. 1" By way of contrast, a union-represented
employee cannot negotiate his or her own wage provisions or contractual grievance procedure. 196 Since statutory employment discrimination claims are not within the zone of exclusive representation, the union has no duty to file such a claim on behalf 197of the
employee or to represent the employee making such a claim. The
union does have a duty to represent the employee with respect to
wages and to negotiate' wage provisions without discrimination or
bad faith, however.
190. See 29U.S.C.§159 (1994).
191. Steele, 323 U.S. at 204.
192. Id.; see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.171 (1967).
193. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
194. Under the NLRA, prohibitions on employment discrimination are conditions of employment and therefore mandatory subjects of bargaining. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 901
(Patrick Hardin, ed., 3d ed. 1992). When a subject is mandatory, neither party may refuse to
bargain about the subject and either party may insist to impasse on inclusion of a provision relating to the subject in the collective bargaining agreement and take economic action to co1npel
such inclusion. See NLRB v. Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
195. An arbitration award which conflicts with a settlement of a discrimination claim may be
enforced against the employer, however, where the union was not involved in the settlement. See
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
196. Indeed the employer who negotiates individually with an employee represented by a
union violates Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. See Medo Photo Supply
Corp. v. NLRB, 321U.S.678 (1944); Allied-Signal, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 752 (1992).
197. MALIN, supra note 185, at 414 ("No court has suggested that a union has an affirmative
duty to litigate on behalf of the employees it represents to redress discrimination.").
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In holding that statutory claims must be arbitrated, courts are
requiring the union to represent the employee with respect to the
statutory claim. Employees who want to litigate apparently are relegated to suing the union for breach of the duty of fair representation.
Yet as demonstrated above, the requirements of the duty do not
hold the union to the standard of an attorney handling a statutory
claim for an individual in any forum. If this is unsatisfactory from
the point of view of the employee, it also creates significant difficulties for the union.
While the courts have been deferential to union decisions in arbitration of contractual claims because of the union's representation
of collective interests, it is not clear that the same deference will be
applied when the claim is statutory."' Must the union train its representatives in employment discrimination law? Must it use lawyers in
discrimination cases? Must the union educate its representatives
about arbitrator selection for statutory cases?"' Does the union's
decision not to arbitrate bind the employee? If the arbitrator rules
against the union, finding no discrimination, must the union request
review of the decision in court? Alternatively, if the arbitrator rules
for the union and the employer does not comply with the decision,
does the duty of fair representation require the union to seek enforcement, regardless of its financial resources?
Unions must allocate scarce resources, determining which claims
to arbitrate not only on the basis of merit, but taking into account
the limited resources of the union. 200 Litigation of a statutory discrimination claim can be extremely expensive even if that litigation
198. Some commentators have argued for more extensive judicial review of arbitral decisions
on statutory issues. See, e.g., Estreichcr, supra note 126, at 796; Martin H. Malin & Robert F.
~adenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilme1~ 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993); Ronald Turner,
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims with Special Reference to the
Three A's-Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231, 293 (1996).
199. See Stephen L. Hayford, The Coming Third Era of Labor Arbitration, 48 ARB. J, 8
(1993) (Advocates in arbitration cases involving statutory issues must select arbitrators with the
necessary expertise in the substantive law).
200. An arbitrator's charge for a single arbitration is, on average, $2222.38. LAURA J.
'?OOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A COURSEBOOK 463 (1996) (1992 statis~lCS from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service). If a lawyer is used, costs increase sub,,stantially. Id. at 464. Not only must the union pay the attorney's fees, but briefs and transcripts
-~re used more frequently when lawyers are involved in the arbitration, adding to the cost. Id.
urthermore arbitrating a statutory claim could be even more expensive. See infra notes 206-07
':_~lld accompanying text. For further information about arbitrator fees in statutory disputes, see
ole v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480-81 and n.8 ($700 per day is average arbiator's fee according to the American Arbitration Association, but some arbitrators charge
00-$600 per hour and the typical employment case requires 15-40 hours of arbitrator time).
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takes place in the arbitral forum.
For example, to litigate a discrimination case effectively, expert witnesses may be required."'
So203
Statistiphisticated statistical analysis may be necessary as well.
cians and other expert witnesses can add significant expense to
arbitration. 204 Additionally, discrimination claims
often involve so205
Absent specialized
phisticated inquiries into employer motive.
training, the traditional labor arbitrator may lack the expertise necessary to deal with such issues.206 The same skepticism applies to the
union officials who must make determinations regarding the merits
of discrimination claims in deciding whether to arbitrate them, and
then arbitrate those with merit. Obtaining the necessary 207
expertise
would impose a cost beyond the resources of most unions, yet the
alternative under the Fourth Circuit's rule is either ineffective litigation or no litigation of most statutory claims.
If an employee's only chance to litigate a discrimination claim is
through a duty of fair representation suit, such suits
are likely to in208
If arbitration is
crease, particularly if unions decline to arbitrate.
201. See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F.L.
REV. 169, 203 (1991) (noting that unions do not become actively involved in protecting public
rights outside of collective bargaining because they lack the resources, particularly when legal

representation is involved.)
202. See Price, Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
203. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440
(1982); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). For discussion of the use of
statistical evidence in employment dAscrimination cases, see 2 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1687~1737 (3d ed. 1996); MICHAEL J.
ZIM:MER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 278-98, 477-87

(4th ed.1997).
204. See, e.g., Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 758 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 971
F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1992) (Plaintiff in ADEA case sought $68,009.25 in expert witness fees).
205. See Michael J, Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 563, 564 (1996) (noting both that "the essence of
most cases ... turns on the issue of whether the employer acted with an intent to discriminate"
and that "the concept of individual disparate treatment discrimination ... is difficult and complicated.") Zimmer's article demonstrates the complexity of the proof schemes under disparate

treatment discrimination law.
206. See supra note 161.
207. See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text regarding the cost of legal representation
and supra note 204 regarding the cost of experts. The average labor arbitrator's charge is
$2222.38, see note 200 supra. Most local unions, whose only income is from employee dues, can
afford to arbitrate only a few cases per year and many do not use attorneys because of the cost of
legal representation. In right to work states, where employees are not required to pay the cost of
representation, union resources are even more limited. Notably, three of the five states in the
Fourth Circuit are right to work states. See ARCHIBALD COX, ET AL., CASES ON LABOR LAW
1090 (12th ed. 1996) (North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia).
208. If the employee files an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations
Board alleging breach of the duty of fair representation based on a union's refusal to arbitrate a
statutory claim, the N.L.R.B., in determining whether the duty was breached, would have to de-
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costly, a duty of fair representation case is more so. ' Moreover, litigation of statutory claims in grievance arbitration may further formalize arbitration, a concern that has already surfaced due to the increasing use of lawyers." 0 Ironically, a decision supporting and
encouraging arbitration may lead to elimination of some of the advantages of arbitration, such as speed and informality. Given the difficulties created for unions and employees by the Fourth Circuit rule,
the question arises whether there exist alternatives for unions desiring to protect the statutory rights of employees. The next section
considers such alternatives.
IV. UNION PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE RIGIITS

Thus far this article has argued that arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements differs substantially from arbitration under
individual agreements and that the Supreme Court should reaffirm
that distinction, which it recognized in earlier cases. It might be argued, however, that despite the rule ofthe Fourth Circuit, unions can
protect employee statutory rights. A review of the alternatives available to unions seeking to preserve the statutory rights of employees
to be free from discrimination,211 however, demonstrates that none
satisfactorily protects employee rights without sacrificing important
collective goals or risking duty of fair representation claims. Because
duty of fair representation claims are costly to the union, they ultimately injure employees by limiting the union's effectiveness in rep,
resenting the employees in the bargaining unit.

cide whether the employee's claim was meritorious. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 337, 307 N.L.R.B.
437 (1992) (union lawfully refused to arbitrate employee's grievance where merits of grievance
~ere, at most, debatable). Thus, as part of the resolution of the unfair labor practice charge, an
tne~perienced and unauthorized agency would become enmeshed in deciding whether discrimination statutes other than the National Labor Relations Act have arguably been violated.
209. A duty of fair representation case will certainly require attorneys' fees and unless the
-,:case_ is quickly dismissed, discovery costs as well. COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 200, at 464
(arbitration is cheaper than litigation).
-:;--:-: 210. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Delawyerizing Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 95,
~07 (1989); Creeping Legalism in Labor Arbitration: An Editorial, 13 ARB. J.129 (1958).
<-~, 211. This is a matter of concern to unions in the Fourth Circuit presently and in the First,
;,:Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits where no definitive ruling has been issued by the
_-so~rt of Appeals. Based on Austin, district courts in the Fourth Circuit continue to dismiss
~_auns based on collectively-bargained arbitration provisions. See, e.g., Brown v. ABF Freight
_,)'Stem, I~~-, 1998WL105641 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 1998) (where contract refers to discriminatory
,_C2ts proh1b1ted by law, plaintiff's ADA claim is dismissed for failure to arbitrate).

.

,_
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A. Preserving Litigation Rights Using Contractual Language

Unions might protect employee litigation rights by eliminating
contractual nondiscrimination provisions and expressly limiting the
grievance procedure to contractual disputes. With such contractual
provisions, there would be no arbitrable grievance and the employee
212
would be relegated to judicial action. There are several problems
with this approach, however. First, while many grievance and arbitration provisions are limited to contractual disputes, others are
broader.213 Narrowing the grievance and arbitration procedure in
those contracts would prevent the union from both grieving and arbitrating many disputes other than statutory claims. Accordingly, employees would lose substantial rights unrelated to statutory discrimination.
To eliminate this problem, the union could seek to exclude
statutory claims from arbitration expressly, while retaining the broad
arbitration language for other noncontractual issues. There is little
incentive for an employer to agree to such a proposal, however. Arbitration of statutory claims is an alternative to litigation, one which
may well benefit the employer as evidenced by the increasing use of
214
An employer is
arbitration agreements in the nonunion sector.
unlikely to give up the protection of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims while allowing the union to retain the right to arbitrate
other noncontractual claims. To obtain such a contractual change
the employer might insist t~at the union make economic concessions,
215
thereby causing the employees to sacrifice other benefits.
212. Of course, the employee would first have to exhaust administrative remedies. See 29
U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994) (charge must be filed with EEOC before filing judicial action under
ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l), (f)(l) (1994) (under Title VII charge must be filed with the
EEOC, which will issue notice of right to sue, and the individual must file suit within 90 days of
receipt of such notice); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994) (adopting Title VII procedures for enforcement
of ADA).
213. See, e.g., Wright, 1997 WL 422869 at *2.
214. A survey by the General Accounting Office indicated that 19o/o of the private employers
responding used arbitration to resolve workplace disputes. U.S. GEN. Acer. OFF., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS' EXPERIENCES WilH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE,
GAO/GGD-97-157 (1997). Private employers adopted alternative dispute resolution to reduce
the costs-in time, money and good employment relationships - associated with "employmentrelated lawsuits and discrimination complaints." Id. at 8. The number of cases in which employers
have sought dismissal of statutory discrimination claims based on collectively bargained grievance and arbitration procedures also indicates the importance of such provisions to employers.
For further discussion of the reasons employers may prefer arbitration of discrimination claims,
see R. Theodore Clark, Jr., A Management View of Nonunion Employee Arbitration Procedures,
in LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER FlRE, supra note 166, at 162.
215. Of course, collective bargaining is about exchanging benefits and requires tradeoffs by
both parties, but in this case the employees are giving up economic benefits to preserve rights
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Removal of contractual nondiscrimination provisions, necessary
to insure retention of the litigation alternative, takes away an option
for the union and the employees."' The union would be unable to
grieve and arbitrate discrimination claims against the employer.217
Some employees may prefer to arbitrate discrimination claims, an
option that would be lost by eliminating language requiring or permitting arbitration of statutory claims. 21 ' Accordingly, the union may

,,
'iy
ts

which Congress gave them by statute.
216. Arbitration is a matter of agreement. If there is no agreement to arbitrate a particular
claim, arbitration cannot be compelled. AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 475
U.S. 643, 648-49 (1986). If arbitration of contractual discrimination claims remains an option, the
inability to arbitrate a statutory claim may be irrelevant, however. The employee could arbitrate
the contractual claim (assuming the union decided to arbitrate) and if the employee lost, litigate
the statulory claim based on common facts. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53-54 (arbitrator
has authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights even where the contractual rights are
similar to statutory nondiscdmination rights). Elimination of language referring to the statute
might limit the union's ability to argue that statutory standards should be applied in arbitration of
contractual discrimination issues also. There is substantial debate in the arbitral community ·
about the use of external law in arbitration and an argllment could be made that a contractual
change eli1ninating statutory language evidenced an intent to limit the use of statutory standards
by the arbitrator. See COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 200, at 61-76 and authorities cited therein.
217. It is not at all uncommon for unions to arbitrate discrimination claims. See, e.g., Chicago
Transit Auth. and Amalgatnated Transit Union Local 305, 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 753 (1990)
(Goldstein, Arb.); P.D.I. Inc, and International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 276, 91 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 21 (1988) (Dworkin, Arb.). Nor is it unusual for the union to grieve employer action on ·
several bases, one of which is discrimination. See, e.g., ITI Federal Servs. Corp. and International
Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 959, 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 289 (1995) (Landau, Arb.) (union challenged grievant's layoff as violative of the agreement's nondiscdmination clause and the seniodty
·clause). Even in the absence of a contractual prohibition on discrimination, a union could still
challenge terminations or other discipline as discriminatory based on a contractual requirement
;of just cause for discipline or discharge. See, e.g., Thrifty Cos. and United Food & Commercial
·:·Workers Union, Local 839, 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 317 (1994) (Staudohar, Arb.) (union chal}enged discharge of diabetic employee as without just cause based on the lack of an absenteeism
·policy and inconsistent treatment of illness-related absences, although arbitrator relied on ADA
t!_) support his decision); Jefferson-Smurfit Corp. and Graphic Communications Int'l Local 16-C,
_03 ~b. Arb. (BNA) 1041 (1994) (Canestraight, Arb.) (although there was no accommodation
qurrement in the collective bargaining agreement, union challenged termination of employee
.h Wrist injury as without just cause because the employer did not accommodate her as reed by the ADA). If the parties eliminated a nondiscrimination clause in negotiations, howr' the employer might argue that the parties intended to remove discrimination cases from
tractual challenge under the just cause provision of the contract. See City of Flint and Lieuants & Captains Ass'n, 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) (1991) 1 (McDonald, Arb.) (use of bargaining
or~ to establish intent of the parties). For a thorough discussion of recent arbitration awards
lvtng disability issues, see Thomas E. Terrill, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Labor
itration: Recent Awards, 48 LAB. L.J. 3 (1997).
18. Ar~.ltration may provide a quicker, cheaper forum for hearing discrimination claims,
e of which would not otherwise be litigated because of the time or cost. See Lisa B. Bingham,
loyment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS & EMPLOYMENT POL J.
;·l 89-90 (1997). For further discussion of the advantages of the arbitral forum, see Grodin,
note 121, at 50-51; Turner, supra note 198, at 289-84. Choosing arbitration over litigation
ave significant disadvantages, however. In addition to the absence of discovery, which may
.the employee's ability to prove the claim, evidence suggests that monetary recovery is
In arbitration than litigation. Bingham, supra, at 243.
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be faced with conflicting employee desires with respect to the nondiscrimination provisions, creating potential division within the bargaining unit. And bargaining unit divisions, of course, weaken the
union's negotiating power. Moreover, even if all employees desired
removal of contractual nondiscrimination provisions or opposed inclusion of them, it is highly unlikely that the issue would be a strike
issue for a sufficient number of employees for the union to achieve
its objective over employer opposition.
Furthermore, in some cases arbitration might be the most appropriate forum for finding an effective solution in a discrimination
case. For example, in a dispute about reasonable accommodation
under the ADA where the accommodation might conflict with the
collective bargaining agreement, arbitration provides a forum where
the contractual and statutory issues can be treated together."' Accordingly, while the absence of contractual agreement to arbitrate
statutory rights may enable employees to litigate statutory claims, it
may eliminate the right to arbitrate such claims in situations where
arbitration would provide an adequate remedy.
Another problem with this approach is the existence of case law
finding failure to negotiate a nondiscrimination clause to be evidence
of unlawful discrimination on the part of the union. In Macklin v.
Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 220 for example, the court stated, albeit
in dicta, that where the union has not negotiated protection from discrimination for the employees and "there is such solid evidence of
employer discrimination :'. . it would undermine Title VII's attempt
to impose responsibility on both unions and employers to hold that
union passivity at the negotiating table in such circumstances cannot
constitute a violation of the Act. "221 Other courts have used an efforts test in determining whether a union is liable under Title VII for
where it
discriminatory contract provisions, absolving the union only
222
makes all reasonable efforts to eliminate discrimination.
Under
this test, failure to negotiate a nondiscrimination provision might in219. Rabin, supra note 201, at 248-49. For a discussion of the potential for conflict between
accommodations under the ADA and the collective bargaining agreement, see Hodges, supra
note 121, at 614-25.
220. 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
221. Id. at 989.
222. See, e.g., Howard v. International Molders & Allied Workers, Local 100, 779 F.2d 1546,
1548 (11th Cir. 1986); Waker v. Republic Steel Corp., 675 F. 2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1982); Terrell v.
United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted and
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. International Molders & Allied Workers Union Local 342 v. Terrell, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 680 F. Supp. 1377,
1397-98 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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crease the probability that the union will be held liable for unlawful
discrimination. Accordingly, the union runs a risk when it fails to
negotiate a nondiscrimination provision. If it seeks to eliminate an
existing nondiscrimination provision, the risk might be even greater
unless the court considering a discrimination claim was willing to
recognize that the purpose of the union's action was to free employees to seek judicial resolution of discrimination cases."'

B. Permitting Employees to Arbitrate Discrimination Claims

t
t

t

A second alternative for dealing with this problem is to allow
employees to arbitrate all discrimination claims at their own expense.
As reflected in the cases discussed above, the employee has no right
to insist on arbitration and no right to control arbitration, including
no right to his or her own legal representative."' A union could
agree to allow an employee to arbitrate his or her own case, however. Of course, this does not prov.ide the employee with the rights
available in litigation, such as a jury trial and extensive discovery, but
it does insure that the employee has a forum to hear the discrimination claim. Since unions cannot arbitrate every case, a union could
decline to arbitrate a discrimination claim without breaching the duty
of fair representation. When that decision deprives the employee of
any opportunity for a hearing on a statutory claim, however, it complicates the already difficult decision about which of the many grievances filed to arbitrate.
A decision not to arbitrate a discrimination claim has political
implications for the union officers, who may be accused by the members of discrimination. Member dissatisfaction may lead to 225
political
Furdefeat of the officers or even decertification of the union.

>r

it
ff
~-

223. Elimination of the nondiscrimination provision might equally be viewed as evidence that
the union wanted to escape the responsibility of representing employees in the grievance procedur~ on nondiscrimination claims. A union taking this approach should clearly state the reason
" for its position in the contract negotiations and keep careful records of the negotiations so that it
c~ p:ove, if challenged, that its intent was to protect the employees' right to sue for statutory
violations.
224. See supra notes 143-60 and accompanying text.

46,

1v.
ind
Lo177,

2~5. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act requires local unions to hold
-~lections .of officers at least every three years. 29 U.S.C. § 48l(b) (1994). Decertification petins, w~ch must be supported by at least thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining unit,
ay be ~le~ when no collective bargaining agreement is in effect or between 90 and 60 days be~ exprration of the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc.,
. N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962); De Luxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958). No decertifition petition may be filed in the first year after certification of the union, however. Brooks v.
RB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
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thermore, the union may be sued for breach of the duty of fair representation or charged with violating discrimination laws for failing to
arbitrate a discrimination grievance."' While all of these risks exist
for unions even in the absence of decisions binding employees to the
union's grievance procedure for discrimination claims, the risk is exacerbated when the union's decision deprives the employee of a
hearing on his or her discrimination claim.
Allowing the employee to arbitrate the grievance minimizes
these risks, but does not eliminate them, and poses other difficulties
for the union. The union maintains control over the grievance procedure for several reasons."' First, an incentive for employers to
agree to grievance and arbitration procedures is the screening function performed by the union."' The employer is freed from having
to deal with many employee complaints because the union determines that they do not rise to the level of contract violations or that
its resources are better spent on more significant issues. Abandonment of the screening function may discourage arbitration agreements.
Second, the arbitrator serves as contract reader for the parties"'
determining what the contract means. Submission of a grievance to
arbitration gives the arbitrator control over contract
terms. Where
230
the risk of an adverse determination is significant, the union can
decline to arbitrate, preserving the right to assert its interpretation of
the provision and to negotiate a satisfactory solution. Accordingly,
giving up the right to dedde which grievances to arbitrate creates
significant problems for the union. Allowing an employee to arbitrate with her own representative and make strategy decisions poses
226. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186 (courts have jurisdiction of duty of fair representation claims);
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enf't denied, 326 F.2d 172 {2d Cir. 1963) (breach of
the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994)
(prohibiting discrimination by unions on the basis of race, gender, national origin and religion);
42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994) (union is covered entity barred from discriminating under the
Americans with Disabilities Act); 29 U.S.C. § 623{c) (1994) (prohibiting age discrimination by
unions).
227. Of course there is a financial reason for the union to retain control over decisions to arbitrate because the union can afford to arbitrate only a limited number of cases.
228. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191-92.
229. St. Antoine, supra note 10, at 1138-40.
230. The risk may be great because of the facts underlying the grievance or because the contractual interpretation argument of the union is weak. Alternatively, the risk may be great because an adverse decision would affect a large number of bargaining unit members. In the latter
case, even if the chances of winning are more than even, the union may not want to risk an adverse decision. In the former case, the union might prefer to wait for a case with better facts to
challenge the company's interpretation of the contract. The axiom "hard cases make bad law"
applies equally in grievance arbitration.

1998]

t
:29

0

·e
n

Jf
y,
11-

es
ts);
of
J4)

n);
the
by
ar-

on.better
ad:S to
'aw"

PROTECTING UNIONIZED EMPLOYEES

165

the same risks of adverse determination. The employee's attorney
might choose to make arguments that undermine the union's position in other cases. While these risks may not be as great for arbitration cases involving statutory discrimination claims, allowing employees to arbitrate discrimination cases but not other cases may
make the union more vulnerable to duty of fair representation
claims. At a minimum, the union would have to justify the differential treatment, which could be attacked as arbitrary or discriminatory
or both. 231 Additionally, there may be substantial overlap between
contractual and statutory claims, making it impossible for the union
to permit individual arbitration of statutory claims only."'
Finally, allowing the employee to arbitrate may not accomplish
the desired result because the expense may be prohibitive. Given
the lack of discovery and the absence of a jury in arbitration,"' the
employee may be unable to find an attorney to represent her on a
231. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190. This differe~tial treabnent might also be challenged as viola~
tive of antidiscrimination laws. For example, an African-American female employee terminated
for absenteeism who challenged the termination as discriminatory would be able to arbitrate her
claim even if the union determined not to arbitrate. A white 1nale employee terminated for absenteeism who challenged his termination as without just cause, but made no statutory discri1nination clai1n, would be bound by the union's decision not to arbitrate. The potential for discrimination claims against the union is obvious, not to mention the potential for political backlash
against the union and racial and gender division within the union's membership. While such division may, at first blush, appear to be beneficial to the employer-united we stand, divided we··
fall-the resulting disruption may affect productivity as well as make it difficult for the union to
negotiate a satisfactory collective bargaining agreement, leading to unnecessary labor strife.
232. For example, a termination could be challenged as without just cause under the collective bargaining agreement and also discriminatory in violation of one of the discrimination statutes. The challenge to just cause might be based not only on discrimination, but on other factors
such as lack of due process or lack of notice that conduct the employee engaged in was prohibited.
233. Furthermore, it is not clear that an arbitrator under a collective bargaining agreement,
even one that incorporated statutory clai1ns, would feel free to award compensatory or punitive
damages absent express authorization from the parties, since such damages are not generally
awarded in labor arbitration. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 162, at 589-92 (noting that
punitive damages are generally not awarded unless clearly justified and compensatory damages
are usually make whole awards such as back pay). Even where such damages are clearly
a_uthorized, monetary awards are generally lower in arbitration than jury awards in discriminatto~ cases, further reducing the likelihood that the attorney would take the case on a contingency
basis. See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employ1nent Discrimination: What Really
Does Happen? What Really Should flappen?, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995 at 40, 45 (citing
study which found that mean and median jury verdicts in litigated employment discrimination
;;. cases were three times higher than awards in arbitrated discrimination cases). In cases where no
;.: .. back pay is involved, such as harassment, the problem would be even more acute. See Bales, su, _pra note 121, at 740. The same is true for awarding attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs. See
ELKOU~I & ELKOURI, supra note 162, at 592 ("it is not customary practice to award attorney
fees agamst the offending party in arbitration."); 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 203, at
i859-61 (citing statutory authority for awarding attorneys fees to prevailing plaintiffs). Inability
to c?llect attorneys' fees from the employer is likely to discourage many attorneys from reprcntmg plaintiffs in discrimination cases.
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contingency basis. And it is unlikely that an employee covered by a
collective bargaining agreement would have sufficient income or assets to hire an experienced attorney on an hourly basis."' Thus, this
option, even if chosen by the union, which is unlikely, would, in all
probability, not effectuate the purposes of the laws prohibiting discrimination.
C. Union Assistance with Litigation or Voluntary Arbitration

The rapid growth of statutory rights in the workplace has led to
suggestions that unions can assist employees in the enforcement of
these statutory rights. 235 The Fourth Circuit's decisions force this role
on the union to the detriment of both employees and unions. Unions can support employees in either litigation or voluntary arbitration of statutory claims, however. Unions have access to information
with respect to employer policies and practices and treatment of
similarly situated employees, which may assist employees challenging
discriminatory treatment."' Unions also can identify potential witnesses that may support an employee's claim and encourage them to
testify. In addition, the presence of a union-negotiated just cause
provision for termination or discipline provides protection to employees against retaliation for their testimony. Unions can provide
this assistance whether the employee chooses to litigate or arbitrate.
While there has been substantial criticism of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims, particularly where employees are required to
agree to arbitration as a condition of employment, truly voluntary
arbitration has met with less criticism."' A procedure that provides
employees with the option of arbitration and allows the choice to be
made at the time the dispute arises does not involve the coercion that
234. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really
l-lave To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 256, 289 (1994) (indicating that even a
retainer of $2500---:..$5000 is a bar to obtaining representation). On the other hand, it has been
suggested that legal representation in arbitration might be more affordable because the time expenditure would be limited. Id.
235. Rabin, supra note 201, at 171-72. Professor Clyde Summers has suggested that statutory
remedies may be ineffective where employees have no union representation because the employer has "dominant authority in the workplace, greater knowledge, larger resources," and is a
repeat player in the enforcement process. Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for E1nployrnenl
Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 543-44 (1992).
236. Where similarly situated employees of a different race or gender are treated differently,
an employee would have a claim of disparate treatment in violation of Title VII. See 1
LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 203, at 10 (citing McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc. 851
F.2d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 1988) (where nonwhite employees were disciplined more harshly than
white employees.)).
237. See authorities cited supra note 166.
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is present, if implicit, where the employee is asked (or certainly required) to agree to arbitration upon hiring or even while employed,
but before any dispute arises."' In the collective bargaining setting,
the problem is not individual coercion, but the lack of individual
choice. Since the union is the employee's collective bargaining representative, she cannot negotiate a separate agreement with the employer; she is bound by the union's contract."' If the union's negotiation of a prohibition on discrimination which is subject to the
grievance and arbitration procedure bars litigation, the employee's
rights have been waived solely by virtue of her representation by a
union. This is true regardless of whether she is a union member, regardless of whether she supported the contract, regardless of
whether the union had any knowledge that it was waiving individual
employee rights by negotiating protection against discrimination, and
regardless of whether the protection negotiated by the union is ade, quate.
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Even if the employee cannot l:le forced to arbitrate under the
collective bargaining agreement, she may choose voluntarily to arbi1
trate her discrimination claim after it arises." If she does so, the
union can support litigation of the claim in the arbitral forum by
providing information to the employee that would support her claim.
Moreover, the presence of union representation may help alleviate
the concerns raised by the fact that the employer will be a repeat
242
player in arbitration while the employee will not.
The employee
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See Grodin, supra note 121, at 38,
239. See Malin, supra note 92, at 87.
240. See supra notes 167, 183-85 and accompanying text.'
241. If the employer has a procedure for arbitration of statutory claims for nonunion employ-:_eys, it could be made available on an optional basis to union employees. For the union to rec,_ ommend the procedure to bargaining unit members, however, it would have to be convinced that
-~e procedure provided a fair and effective forum for statutory claims. Several groups have atpted to set forth guidelines for fair and effective arbitration of statutory disputes. See, e.g.,
ototype Agreement, supra note 161, at E-11 (setting forth the Due Process Protocol for Median and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship pre:~red by the Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment); The Committee on
_::~bor And Employment Law, Final Report on Model Rules for the Arbitration of Employment
',tsputes, so RECORD OF THE Ass'N OFTIIE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 629 (1995) (setting forth
odel Procedures for the Resolution of Employment Disputes prepared by the Committee Lar and Employment Law of the New York bar). The Due Process Protocol has been endorsed
_the Board of Governors of the National Academy of Arbitrators and by union and managet representatives of the Employment and Labor Law Section of the Ainerican Bar Associa. Academy Board Endorses ADR Task Force Protocol, 149 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 6 at
(June 5, 1995); ABA Approves ADR Proces1:; Protocol, 154 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 209
b ruary 24, 1997).
42. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Bingham,
,a note 218, at 192-93. Bingham's study demonstrated statistically significant reductions in
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may be disadvantaged by a lack of familiarity with the arbitration
procedure and lack of information about arbitrators,
so that a role in
243
In addition, the
selecting the arbitrator may be relatively useless.
arbitrator may have an economic incentive, conscious or unconscious, to satisfy the employer because the employer is a source of
244
future business for the arbitrator.
245
The union can help reduce these disadvantages.
The union
could collect information about arbitrators and make it available to
employees. The potential for repeated use by unionized employees,
with the union available as a vehicle for sharing information about
arbitrators, should help counteract any repeat customer bias favoring
the employer."' The union could maintain a data bank of arbitration
decisions, information about arbitrators, and perhaps even a list of
attorneys in the area that represent employees in discrimination
cases. Moreover, the presence of the union in the workplace and the
collective bargaining agreement limiting termination provides protection for employees who might be subject to retaliation."'
employee success in nonunion arbitration where the employer was a repeat player. See id. at 213.
Bingham notes that the study does not establish a cause of the repeat player phenomenon. Id. at
214.243. See Lisa R. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: Differences between Repeat Player and
Nonrepeat Player Outcomes, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 201, 202, 207 (1997) (noting that repeat player
employers have the advantage of institutional memory which leads to informed arbitrator selec·•
tion)
244. See Estreicher, supra note 126, at 764; Peter M. Panken, et al., Avoiding Employment
Litigation: Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90's, 53 ALl-ABA
(LEXIS, CLE Library, ALl-ABA file) (1996) (noting that an arbitrator must be fair to major
clients which are employers in the nonunion context); AAA President Predicts Upswing in Use of
ADR, Individual Employment Rights (BNA) 3 (July 20, 1993) (noting concern for repeat customer bias); Bingham, supra note 243, at 207-08 (empirical study in which only two employers
who used the same arbitrator in multiple cases won all of their cases, a "troublesome trend ...
which bears watching.").
245. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1475-76.
246. Bingham, supra note 243, at 196-97, 219. Bingham suggests that unions could provide
limited membership to employees at unrepresented workplaces and offer representation in e1nployment arbitration as a benefit. Id. at 219.
247. Although retaliation is unlawful under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, lengthy
procedures and the difficulty of proof may make arbitration under a just cause provision a more
valuable remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 12203 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)
(1994). Ninety-seven percent of collective b~rgaining agreements require cause or just cause for
discipline and discharge. See COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 200, at 87' citing BASIC PATTERNS
IN UNION CONTRACTS (13th ed. 1992). Furthermore, the union may protect against more subtle
forms of retaliation. See Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE
L.J. 916, 923, 934-36 (1979); Martha West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 lJ. ILL. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (reinstatement has been most successful as a remedy in Jabot-arbitration because the presence of the union and the grievance and arbitration process dissipates the fear of employer retaliation).
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If, as is likely without a formal procedure, few employees choose
to arbitrate, the union's ability and incentive to collect information
about arbitration will be limited. Employees with statutory claims
might be more likely to choose to arbitrate claims if the union were
more extensively involved in the arbitration procedure. The union
could play a greater role by negotiating a procedure for knowing and
voluntary post-claim arbitration of statutory claims if it determined
that it would benefit the employees."' The employer would have an
incentive to agree to such a procedure as it might encourage employees to arbitrate rather than litigate, an option clearly preferable to at
least some employers given the proliferation of arbitration provisions
249
in the nonunion setting.
Because of the risk of duty of fair representation claims, however, this option may have little appeal for unions. Even the limited
role of collecting and disseminating to all employees information
about arbitrators and the arbitral process may expose the union to
allegations that it has not fairly provided assistance to a particular
individual. Going beyond this role by recommending arbitrators or
providing information about particular employer practices or possible witnesses increases the risk that the union may be perceived to be
providing more assistance to certain employees or recommending inferior arbitrators. Involvement in the negotiation of the procedure
increases the likelihood that the duty of fair representation would be
250
applied to the union's role.
It can be argued that if the union negotiates an arbitration procedure and it is available to employees to use at their option, then it
should be covered by the duty of fair representation. Statutory dis,
248. Further consideration of several issues would be necessary were such a procedure to be
negotiated. For example, where contractual and statutory issues overlap, which procedure would
b_e used? One possibility would be to require the employee to choose. Because of the disincen~1ve of the duty of fair representation, however, negotiation of such a procedure is unlikely. See
infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
. 2~0. Negotiation of a separate arbitration procedure might have another downside. If discnmination claims are litigated under the contractual grievance procedure, the union is entitled
to information that is relevant and necessary to process the grievances. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). Thus the union could aid the employee in obtaining some discovery relevant to the discrimination claim by requesting information. The employer might argue
that the union was not entitled to the information for use in a noncontractual grievance procedure .. The NLRB has held, however, that the union is entitled to data relating to the demoj--_ , g.raphic. makeup of the employer's workforce, EEOC charges against the employer, and affirmah~e ~ction plans, where the union sought the information for the express purpose of bringing a
/;-,cij.s~n~ination suit against the employer. See Westinghouse Blee. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 106 (1978),
~nf din part, 648 F2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Accordingly, data should be equally available for use
>-_m an arbitration procedure limited to statutory claims.
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crimination claims relate to employment and the union should represent all employees fairly even when it comes to statutory claims.
The better argument, however, is that a voluntary arbitration
procedure for statutory claims is an alternative to litigation which
does not implicate the duty of fair representation. Courts have not
found a union duty to litigate on behalf of employees to remedy discrimination."' A procedure available only for statutory claims would
be analogous to litigation. The duty of fair representation arises out
of the right of exclusive representation."' Since the employee's
statutory rights are independent of the union, the union is not the
employee's exclusive representative for statutory claims. In a similar
context, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
union did not have a duty with respect to its 253
decision about whether
to ask a court to vacate an arbitration award. The court found that
since the right to ask a court to vacate an arbitration award was not
exclusive to the union, the union had no duty to the employees with
respect to that decision."' The employee himself was free to ask the
court to vacate the award. Unfortunately, not all courts have agreed
with the Seventh Circuit and there is no certainty that the duty would
not be applied in the context of voluntary arbitration of statutory
255

claims.
If the duty of fair representation does not apply, unions could be

far more active in assisting employees in arbitration without fear of
liability. Refusal to app\y the duty of fair representation would not
leave employees wholly without a remedy for union misconduct,
·however. If the union actively discriminated against employees, an
action could be brought against the union under the appropriate discrimination statute.256 In the absence of a fair representation duty,
however, the union could offer a service to its members by providing
257
This additional benefit of
legal counsel in discrimination cases.
251. See MALIN, supra note 185, at 414.
252. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.192 (1944).
253. Freeman v. Local Union 135, Teamsters, 746F.2d1316, 1320 (7th Cir.1984).

254.
1321.
SeeatSear
v. Cadillac Automobile Co., 654 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 198l)(declining to hold that
255. Id.
failure to seek vacation of an arbitration award could never breach the duty of fair representation, but stating that an action should lie, if at all, only when there was blatant unfairness on the
part256.
of the
union).
See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination by unions on the basis ol
race, gender, national origin and religion); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994) (union is covered entity

prohibited from discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act); 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)
(1994) (prohibiting age discrhnination by unions).
257. As noted previously, however, if the union discriminated in providing attorneys on the
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union membership could encourage employees in right to work
states to join the union. The union would benefit through additional
members and the employees would benefit through more effective
enforcement of discrimination statutes. The union could also provide
more active assistance to employees in arbitration, such as guidance
in arbitration techniques and strategy based on union experience,
without fear of liability.
Because of uncertainty about the application of the duty of fair
representation, however, voluntary arbitration does not provide an
effective alternative for enforcement of statutory rights for the unionized employee or the union. The union cannot provide effective
assistance or participate in creating a procedure without risking a
breach of the duty of fair representation. At most, the union could
collect and provide information, available to all employees, should
employees voluntarily choose to arbitrate their claims after a dispute
has arisen.

.

V. THE ROLE OF UNIONS IN STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
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Involvement of unions in statutory discrimination claims may
further the objectives of discrimination statutes by providing individual employees with litigation (or arbitration) assistance, improving
the ability of discriminatees to find lawyers to handle their claims,"'
and providing a screening function to discourage nonmeritorious
Claims."' Such involvement should not be coerced through forcing
such claims into the contractual grievance procedure, however. Such
au approach works to the detriment of the statutory objectives of
· both the NLRA and the discrimination statutes. The union is encouraged either to deprive employees of the statutory litigation forum or to eliminate any contractual protection against discrimination, removing the union from any role other than litigating itself or
assisting employees with litigation. If, in fact, arbitration is a viable
alternative for discrimination claims, it should be encouraged as an
;· Pasis of union membership where the duty of fair representation applied, it would most likely be
qund to have violated that duty. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. Because of the cost
P.f attorney representation, this would be a substantial benefit, but one which the union could not
0 rd to provide to all employees. See Rabin, supra note 201, at 203.
····: 25.8.. Se~ Howard, supra note 234, at 288 (obtaining counsel is difficult for many employment
sc;rurunatlon plaintiffs).
· -:~9 .. Unions provide such a screening function for contractual claims under the grievance and
ration procedure, a fact which has encouraged the negotiation and use of such procedures.

,;iff

Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191-92.
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260

option, with the availability of union support.
Application of the
duty of fair representation t~ such a procedure would discourage
unions from negotiating or participating in a voluntary arbitration
procedure. While there is a persuasive argument that the duty
should not apply, the uncertainty of its application will have a discouraging effect on unions, limiting their involvement. Accordingly,
a legislative declaration that the union's duty of fair representation
does not apply to statutory claims might be necessary to encourage
voluntary arbitration by unionized employees. At present, voluntary
arbitration is not a viable alternative unless individually chosen by an
employee represented by counsel to resolve a discrimination claim
after it has arisen.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVERSE WRIGHT
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Supreme Court should
reverse the Fourth Circuit's decision in Wright and hold that unions
cannot prospectively waive employee rights under the discrimination
statutes by negotiating nondiscrimination provisions in a collective
bargaining agreement or a broad grievance and arbitration provision.
While it might be argued that employees should be required to arbitrate under the collective bargaining agreement prior to filing suit,"'
the requirement that employees exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedure before filing a suit for breach of the collective bargaining agreement is inapposite here. The requirement serves the
salutary purpose of encouraging arbitration of labor disputes and
limiting judicial involvement in contract interpretation."' Thus it furthers the NLRA's goal of encouraging collective bargaining."' Requiring exhaustion of statutory claims does not further that purpose.
Instead, it serves as a trap for the unwary employee who unknowingly fails to file a grievance. In addition, the employee who files a
grievance may neglect to file a timely EEOC charge while waiting for
resolution through the grievance procedure, thereby losing her
260. Several commentators have suggested some form of legislated system for arbitration of
some or all employment discrimination claims. While consideration of the merits of such a system is beyond the scope of this article, were such a system to be implemented, unions could play
an important role in supporting employees if their support were not circumscribed by the duty of
fair representation. For such proposals, see Grodin, supra note 121, at 55; Ann C. McGinley,
Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent Discharge Policy, 51 OHIO
ST. L.l. 1443, 1515 (1996).
261. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885.
262. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653, 656 (1965).
263. Id. at 653.
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claim."" The purposes of the nondiscrimination statutes are not
served by procedures and traps that make it more difficult for employees, who are often unsophisticated, to enforce their rights.
Exhaustion requires the employee to use what may prove to be
an ineffective forum for statutory claims because of the employee's
lack of control over the procedure, which merely adds to the employee's burden in attempting to remedy discriminatory treatment."'
While the employee may vindicate her rights in arbitration, given the
limitations on union resources, it is more likely that the exhaustion
requirement will merely delay resolution of the dispute.
If the union does not arbitrate, the courts will have to determine
whether to hear the claim de novo or, as in the case of contractual
claims, reach the merits only if the employee can prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation, thereby excusing the
failure to exhaust. 266 If the latter rule applies, then the employee's
267
claim will, in all likelihood, never be heard. If the union arbitrates
and loses or wins less than the full remedy that would be available
under the statute, a judicial action may still be filed. The Supreme
Court in Gardner-Denver declined to defer to the arbitrator's deci268
sion in the litigation of the statutory claim.
If that view prevails
and it should for reasons set forth in the opinion and this article, the
arbitration has merely postponed resolution of the dispute."' If not,
courts will have to determine the appropriate level of deference to
the arbitrator's decision.'70 Thus, the exhaustion requirement has little to recommend it as it creates many of the same problems as a
264. See International Union Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976)
(filing of grievance under collective bargaining agreement does not toll statute of limitations) .
265. See supra notes 141-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concerns about the
effectiveness of the forum.
266. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186; Moore v. Duke Power, 971 F. Supp. at 982.
267. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
268. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58.
::~:, 2?9. It is possible that this approach will give an employee "two bites at the apple,'' to the
detriment of the employer, and perhaps the judicial system, because of the expenditure of re·;sources on dual litigation of claims. It is likely, however, that few employees will actually be able
·. to both arbitrate their claim under the collective bargaining agreement and litigate the claim in
,,c.o~t. First, the union will not arbitrate most cases and second, many employees will not actually
tlgate either because of lack of resources, inability to find an attorney, or other reasons. At
os.t, employees may file a charge with the EEOC, which requires an employer response but is
~r less costly than litigation. And even under Gilmer, an enforceable arbitration agreement does
.IJt preclude an EEOC charge. 500 U.S. at 28.
~70. If, as has been suggested, see supra note 196 and accompanying text, judicial review of
bi~ra}- decisions on statutory claims is less deferential, the efficiency gains from exhaustion may
limited. See also Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59 (suggesting de nova review); Rios v. ReyMetals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir.1972) (setting deferral standard).
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complete bar to litigation. Accordingly, the Court should conclude
that collectively-bargained arbitration provisions have no impact on
statutory discrimination rights.
VII. CONCLUSJON

While unions can play an effective role in eliminating discrimination from the workplace, employees should not be deprived of a
judicial forum for discrimination claims by virtue of their coverage
by a collective bargaining agreement. Labor arbitration has served
as an important element of national labor policy, furthering peaceful
settlement of disputes between employers and unions. Labor arbitration was not designed to achieve the goals of antidiscrimination
legislation, however, and imposing that burden will interfere with the
goals of both labor policy and antidiscrimination statutes. The Supreme Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit's Wright decision,
holding that individual statutory nondiscrimination rights cannot be
waived by the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. If arbitration is truly a viable option for statutory claims, Congress should
consider a legislative approach, including a provision barring the application of the duty of fair representation to arbitration of statutory
claims.

